University of Maine School of Law

University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

11-2007

Who Says You're Disabled? The Role of Medical
Evidence in the ADA Definition of Disability
Deirdre M. Smith
University of Maine School of Law, deirdre.smith@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/facultypublications
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Disability Law Commons, and the
Medical Jurisprudence Commons
Suggested Bluebook Citation
Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You're Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Definition of Disability, 82 Tul. L. REV. 1 (2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-publications/22

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

TULANE

L.AWREVIEW
VoL. 82

NOVEMBER2007

, No.1

Who· Says You.'re Disabled?
The Role of Medical Evidence in the
ADA Definition ofDisability
Deirdre M. Smith*
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), enacted by Congress seventeen years ago,
offered disabledpeople a hope for equality and access thathas not been fi.JJflDed Court decisions
halt an overwhelming mE!fority ofclaims at the summaryjudgment stage. A key mechanism for
fencing out disabledpeoples claimsis an improperandpemiciousrequirement basedupon the vezy
construction of disability that the ADA:S proponents aimed to dispel, that medical evidence is
requiredas a thresholdmatterto demonstrate that the statute applies. The statedrationales appliedto
the medical evidence requirement such as the need for corroborating evidence, objective evidence,
or evidence to assistJunes in assessing disabilities that are not obvious, do not withstand analysis
under either the substantive Jaw ofthe ADA or broader summaryjudgmentprinciples. Such a
requirement in fact reflects an unstated rationale: a deep-seated skepticiSJ1? of those claiming
disabilitygeJJerally andADA plaintiffs specificaUy As aresult fudges disregard theproperanalysis
to be apph'ed to summary judgment motions and instead impose a hypertechnica4 heightened
evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in an effort to foreclose potentia.J. malingers' claims :5:om reaching
the trial stage. The detennination ofwhether aperson is truly disabled ormerely exaggerating her
condition to achieve some secondazygain through ADA litigation is one moreproperlyleft tojurors
than to doctors. The continuedl1egemony ofmedicine in identifjing disability. as demonstrated in
the view that physicians can and should serve as gatekeepers of disability claims, wrongly
pathologizes and demeans the category ofdisability and undermines the statute:S effectiveness as a
tool to advance civilrights.
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lNTR()DUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), enacted by
Congress seventeen years ago, offered disabled people a hope of
equality and access that has not been fulfilled. 1 Court decisions halt an
overwhelming majority of claims, particularly in the employment
context, at the summary judgment stage.2 A key mechanism for
fencing out disabled people's claims is the pernicious requirement,
based upon the very construction of disability that the ADA's
proponents aimed to dispel, that medical evidence is required as a
threshold matter to demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to seek
protection under the statute. 3 The medical evidence requirement
embodies and applies a model of disability that pathologizes disabled
people and undermines the statute's effectiveness as a tool to advance
civil rights.
The stated rationales applied to the medical evidence requirement,
such as the need for "corroborating" evidence, "objective" evidence, or
evidence to assist juries in assessing disabilities that are not "obvious,':>'\
in fact reflect a common unstated rationale: a deep-seated skepticism
of those "claiming disability" generally and ADA plaintiffs
specifically. 5 As a result, judges disregard the proper analysis to be
applied to summary judgment motions and instead impose a
1.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified in scattered sections of29, 42,47 U.S.C.).
2.
See iniTa notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Summary judgment is a court
action that resolves part or all of a claim prior to trial. See FED. R. Crv. R 56. Generally, a
motion for summary judgment is made after discovery is completed. See, e.g., Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986); Galv.inv. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007); Smith
Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2007 FED App. 05-6053 (6th Cir.). The
moving party, most often the defendant, assembles and presents to the court a compilation of
certain evidence (i.e. affidavits, exhibits, and deposition testimony) and asserts that in light of
such evidence, there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact, that no reasonable jury could find in
favor of the other party, and that the only issue(s) to be resolved are legal, not factual, in
nature. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986). To avoid
summary judgment, generally the nonmoving party must present admissible evidence to the
court demonstrating that there is a disputed issue of material fact to be resolved at trial. Id at
248.
3.
See infTa notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
4.
See infTa notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
5.
See Michael Berube, Foreword· Pressing the Claim to SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING
DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY, at vii-viii (1998) ("'(C]lairning disability' is sure to
become one ofthe most politically sensitive endeavors a body can undertake. . . . In the wake
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 'claiming disability' will involve taking up a
contested place in an intricate socio-legal apparatus ...."); in!Ta notes 174-230 and
accompanying text.
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hypertechnical, heightened evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in an effort
to foreclose potential malingerers' clairJ;ls from reaching the trial
stage. 6 This skepticism, however, is itself another form of entrenched,
invidious discrimination against people with disabilities, and the
continued reliance on physicians to identifY "true"· disability
unreasonably limits the ADA's reach. 7
Moreover, judges' reliance on medical evidence to screen out
claims . brought by people faking or exaggerating disability is
misplaced. The determination of whether a person is truly disabled or
merely exaggerating her condition to achieve some secondary gain
through ADA litigation is one more properly left to jurors than to
doctors. Doctors themselves do not profess to be able to ascertain
disability or malingering or to accurately assess limitations on major
life ·activities to any degree of accuracy. 8 A plaintiff's testimony is
9
sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of disability. Whether such
evidence, standing alone, is ultimately persuasive in proving disability
is a question for the fact finder.
This Article argues that many courts improperly require plaintiffs
to produce expert medical evidence to establish that they meet the
10
statute's definition of an individual with a disability. As explained in
6.
See inffa notes 73-107 and accompanying text.
7.
See inffa notes 174-230 and accompanying text.
8.
See inffa notes 231-259 and accompanying text.
9.
See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1228 (8th ed: 2004) (defming "prima facie case"
as "[a] party's production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue
and rule in the party's favor"). One possible basis for the entry of summary judgment in
favor of a defendant is a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that she could present sufficient
admissible evidence at trial to establish a prima facie claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317,322-23 (1986). The CelotexCourt stated:
fu our view, the plain language of RUle 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.·
fu such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact;' since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential elerpent of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she
has the burden of proof. ·
Id
10. The scope of this Article is limited primarily to cases decided under the ADA.
However, this is not the only antidiscrimination law used to assert the rights of people with
disabilities. Every state in the country has enacted some form of protection for people with
disabilities in employment and other contexts. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA-No. 6
DEFINING "DISABILITY" IN A CIVIL RIGHTS CONTEXT: THE COURTS' FOCUS ON EXTENT OF
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and

Part II, the statute
regulations are silent on any such requirement,
and the agency interpretive guidance on the ADA offers few explicit
references to the role of medical evidence in ADA disability analyses.
That Part also reviews how disability studies scholars and the ADA's
proponents aimed to shift the predominant thinking on sources of
"disability" from individual pathology to externally imposed barriers
that limit a person's access to all segments of society. Part III's review
of the approaches taken by court decisions expressly addressing the
role ofmedical evidence in an ADA plaintiff's prima facie case reveals
that the strongest trend among the courts is to require such evidence· to
corroborate a claim of disability. However, the stated rationale for that
dominant line of c&ses does not withstand analysis under either the
substantive law of the ADA or broader summary judgment principles,
as Part N demonstrates. Part V argues. that the unstated rationale of
such cases reflects a view that physicians can and should serve as
gatekeepers of such claims to prevent malingerers from getting to trial
and that .such sentiment wrongly pathologizes ·and demeans the
category of "disability." Part VI reviews some evidentiary questions
and implications raised by this examination of the role of medical
evidence and concludes that the rules of evidence do not preclude
plaintiffs from testifying as to their own disabilities. Finally, Part VII
concludes that the C0}1tinued hegemony of medic:irie in identifying
disability impedes the advancement of civil rights of people with
disabilities. 11

LIMITATIONS AS OPPOSED TO FAIR TREATMENT AND. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 12-21 (2003),
available at http://www.ncdgov/newsroom/publications/pd:f/extentoflimitations.pdf· [hereinafter
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF]. Most of these statutes were enacted, in some
part, in advance of the ADA, and several statutes were modeled to some extent on the
language ofthe Rehabilitation Act or amended to parallel the ADA. See id. The statutes may
be more or less restrictive in terms of coverage than the federal antidiscrimination laws. See
id.; Sande L. Buhai, In Th~ Meantime: State Protection ofDisability Civil Rights, 37 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1065, 1065 (2004) (arguing that "[d]evelopments in the various states ... will
ultimately make federal civil rights protections more effective").
11. There is some debate and disagreement within academic .and activist settings
regarding the appropriate and, acceptable language to use to describe the group ofpeople the
statute seeks to protect, such as "people with disabilities" or "disabled people." Both terms
have their defenders, and I will use both interchangeably throughout this Article, following
th_e rationale applied by psychologist Joan Ostrove and her coauthor Danette Crawford:
Many disability rights activists believe that the term "people with disabilities" puts
the person first without undue focus on their physical (or psychological) condition.
Other disabled individuals, particularly in the UK, assert that "disabled person"
should be used to highlight ·the salience of disability oppression. The use of both
terms is meant to recognize and support both perspectives.

i
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THE ADA, REGULATIONS, AND MODELS OF DISABILITY

The starting point for the evaluation of any claim under the ADA
is the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to protection under
the statute as an individual with a "disability."12 There is no catalog or
list of medical diagnoses or conditions that constitute "disabilities" for
purposes of the ADA. Rather, the definition includes the following
three categories:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more ofthe major life activities ofsuch individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 13
The issue of medical evidence comes into play most clearly in cases
brought by individuals seeking to establish disability under the first
category of the ADA's definition, which may be referred to as "actual
disability" claims. 14 In such cases, one must demonstrate disability in
two steps: (1) the presence of a physical or mental impairment (2) that

Joan M. Ostrove & Danette Crawford, "One lady oos so busy staring at me she walkedinto a
ooll':' Interability Relations fi'om the Perspective ofTlilmen with Disabilities, 26 DISABILITY
STUD. Q. 3 n.2 (2006).
12. See42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). For Title I (employment) and Title II (public.
services) claims, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that she is "qualified," as that term is used
in each title. See id § 12111(8) (stating that a person is qualified if she can perform the
essential functions of the position in question, with or without reasonable accommodation);
id § 12131(2) (stating that a person is qualified if she "meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided
by a public entity"). However, the definition of disability in § 12102(2) applies to all ADA
claims. The ADA's approach is in contrast to that ofTitle VII .of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics (e.g., race; gender,
national origin, religion). There have been some attempts, all ultimately unsuccessful, to
amend Title VII to include "handicap" as a protected category. See RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 132-33 (2001).
13. § 12102(2).
14. The focus under the second two categories is the perception, lmowledge, and
beliefs of the defendant. See id Specifically, under the second prong, "a record of such an
impairment," the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that a defendant was aware of the
plaintiff's medical history. See Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229
(11th Cir. 1999). While this necessitates some showing of a history of a sufficiently limiting
impai.n.D.ent, the focus remains on the defendanfs intent and actions in responses to
1mowledge of certain facts. See id To satisfy the third prong, "being regarded as having such
an impairment," a plaintiff must show a specific subjective belief on the part ofthe defendant
that the plaintiff had an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.
See, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating that it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that his employer was aware of his
disability but must also show that his employer perceived that disability as substantially
limiting).

I
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substantially limits one or more specifically identified major life
activities. 15
The text of the ADA's definition of disability, quoted above, is
silent on the role of medical evidence in the determination of either or
both of these two steps for establishing the presence of a qualifying
disability. The same is true of the regulations promulgated to guide
16
implementation and enforcement. However, as discussed in Part lll,
most federal judges assume, with little discussion or analysis, that
most or all ADA claimants have the burden of proving that they are
Such
disabled through. the use of expert medical evidence. 17
conclusion may derive :from the statute's use of the term impainnent
and its association with physical or mental pathology, combined with
the individualized assessment of disability required by the
implementing regulations and case law.

A.

Models ofDisability and Impainnent .

. The use of the term "physical or mental impairment" in the
ADA's definition of disability merits particular examination when
considering the role of medical evidence in ADA claims. The term is
derived directly :from the definition of disability found in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was the first federal statute to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in employment and
public services. 18 There was little, if any, attention given to the term at
the time of the enactment of the earlier statute. 19 However, disability
studies theorists and disability activists attach significance to the term
.impainnent, particularly as it indicates an inextricable · connection
between medicine and disability.
. British scholar Michael Oliver, in his 1990 essay The Politics of
Disablement, was one of the first scholars to analyze the specific
implications of the terms impainnent and disability. 20 The term
impainnent, these scholars argue, refers solely to a physical (or
mental) condition, a "description of the physical body."21 Disability, by
15. § 12102(2)(A).
16. See29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2007).
17. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). The statute's reach, however, is restricted to recipients of
federal funding. Id § 794(a).
19. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
20. MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLEGALAI'PROACH 11
(1990).
21. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621, 700
(1999) (quoting MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

I

li
------------------------·---------------------- _______________I
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contrast, stems solely from society's reaction to the impairment, in
terms of physical barriers or discriminatory attitudes. 22 Thus, people
do not have disabilities, they are disabled by others.
This approach to the concept of disability draws a sharp
distinction between, on the one hand, what disability scholars have
dubbed the traditional "medical model" of disability, in which the
"disability" was something contained within the individual and was the
subject of diagnosis, treatment, and rehabiljtation, and, on the other
hand, the "social model" of disability, in which the disability is
23
understood as something externally imposed on the individual. In
creating this dichotomy, disability scholars and activists challenged the
hegemony of concepts of disability derived from medicine and
pathology.24 As Simi Linton observed:
[T]he medicalization of disability casts human variation as deviance
from the norm, as pathological condition, as deficit, ~d, significantly,
as an individual burden and personal tragedy. Society, in agreeing to
assign medical meaning to disability, colludes to keep the issue within
the purview of the medical establishment, to keep it a personal matter
and ''treat" the condition and the person with the condition rather than

35 (1996)); see Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased
Reasoning?, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 26, 28
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (discussing the impact of the "traditional model of
impairments" on the "subordination of disabled individuals"). Inclusion of the adjectives
"physical or mental" serves to distinguish such impairments from "social" disabilities such as
poverty, race, gender, and other characteristics. See id at 26-27.
22. See Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application a/McDonnell Douglas to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79
MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1518-20 (1995) (arguing that society lumps all disabled people into one
category regardless of their ability and classifies people as either able-bodied or disabled)..
23. Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge ofthe United Nations Convention
on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSEJ. INT'LL. & COM. 287, 291 (2007)
(stating that the medical mqdel of disability views those with disabilities as "sick and in need
of a cure," while the social or human rights model of disability places the responsibility on
society to eliminate the unequal treatment of disabled people).
24. See, e.g., Martin Sullivan, Suf:!iected Bodies: Paraplegia, Rehabilitation, and the
Politics ofMovement, in FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY 27-42 (Shelley
Tremain ed., 2005). Sullivan describes how the use of"medical power" transformed patients
into "subjects." Id He goes on to note, "The medical judges (the priests and priestesses of
secular society), having assumed the right to absolve or condemn [through diagnosis and
other fonns of dividing practices], exercise immense power over people's bodies, their health,
and their lives." ld at 30; see HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE
DEAF CoMMUNITY 24-26 (1992) (describing the "medicalization" of deafuess from
"difference into deviance" by medical professionals).

l'
u
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"treating" the social processes and policies that constrict disabled
25
people's lives.

A second alternative to the medical model is the minority group
model,26 also referred to as the civil rights model,27 which is distinct
from the social model in its focus on the notion that there is (or should
be) a core set of rights to be free from discrimination based upon a
disability. 28
Each of these alternatives compels a reexamination of what we
assume renders a person "disabled." For example, a person who uses a
wheelchair rather than her legs for mobility due to the residual effects
ofrheumatoid arthritis, is "disabled" under the social model onlyto the
extent that buildings contain stairs, revolving doors, and counters that
are more than thirty-four inches off the ground. 29 If ramps and other
features of universal design were ubiquitous, her inability to use her
legs for mobility would have the same impact on her daily life as an

25. LINTON, supra note 5, at 11; see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1479, 1486 (2001) ("One of the
most strongly held tenets of disability rights ideology is the critique of professionalism. To
many disability rights advocates, 'expert' professionals are more threat than help.").
26. See Harlan Balm, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased
Reasoning?, 21 BERKElEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 178-79 (2000) (stating that the minority group
model contends that Americans with disabilities are entitled to the legal and constitutional
protections that other disadvantaged groups receive); Harlan Balm, Introduction: Disability
Policy and the Problem ofDiscrimination, 28 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 293, 294-99 (1985) (explaining
the minority group model); Harlan Balm, The Potential Impact of Disability Studies on
Political Science (As Hi&ll as Wee- ~rsa), 21 PoCY STUD. J. 740, 741 (1993) (stating that the
minority group model differs from the traditional medical and social models of disability).
27. See generally Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights
Model ofDisability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS,
supra note 21, at 72 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (grounding the discussion ofthe civil
rights model in minority group language); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity,
55 ALA. L. REv. 1043, 1054 (2004) [hereinafter Rovner, Disability] (referring to the civil
rights rhode! as an alternative name for the minority group model).
28. See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, ·Redefining "Disability"
Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L.
& PoCy REv. 321, 324-31 (2003) (demonstrating that the civil rights model includes a role of
the environment in disabilitY discrimination); Rovner, Disability, supra note 27, at 1054
(arguing that the civil rights model is an outgrowth of the social model); Laura L. Rovner,
Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 247,
272 [hereinafter Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma] (stating that with the final revision of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress moved towards a civil rights model of disability where
the obstacles facing disabled people stem from both their physical limitations as well as the
limitations imposed on them by society).
29. See generally28 C.F.R. § 36 App. A. (2007) (the ADA "Standards for Accessible
Design").

10
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inability to juggle or to raise one eyebrow, which are not generally
30
regarded as disabilities.
While the medical and social models of disability each represent
oversimplified descriptions of attitudes and experiences, contrasting
the two approaches reveals important considerations regarding the role
of medical concepts in the enforcement of a civil rights statute such as
the ADA. 31 There was no examination of these theoretical models of
disability at the time of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act's enactment
(indeed, there was little, if any input, from disabled people in the
drafting of the statute). 32 The three-prong definition of disability from
that earlier statute was included, in nearly identical form, in the ADA
seventeen years later.33 The decision was not based upon a conclusion
that the specific text of the provision was the best vehicle for
advancing the civil rights of people with disabilities-indeed, many
disability rights advocates felt that the Rehabilitation Act language,
with its focus on impairment and limitations, held too closely to the
medical model. 34 However, federal courts had adopted a broad view of
30. See generallyCtr. for Universal Design, N.C. State Univ. et al., Universal Design
Education Online, http://www.udeducation.org/learn/index.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2007)
("Universal Design is an approach to the design of all products and environments to be usable
by everyone, to the greatest extent possible, regardless of age, ability, or situation.").
31. More recently, many disability studies scholars have questioned the utility of
strict compliance with the social model, particularly as it has been explained and used by
British scholars. For example, Tom Shakespeare, a British disability studies scholar who
once, as he describes it, "was a critical friend of the social model," has more recently argued
that it is now time to abandon the model. TOM SHAKESPEARE,. DISABILITY RIGHTS AND
WRONGS 5 (2006). Some scholars criticize the social model for "neglect[ing] the role of
impairment" in the lives of disabled people. Id at 38-39 (citing the work of Sally French, Liz
Crow, and Carol Thomas); see OLIVER, supra note 21, at 31, 37-41 ('~longside th[e]
proliferation of different models [of disability,] disabled people themselves have begun to
question the explanatory power· of the social model. I myself questioned the way the social
model was becoming a straight jacket for our experience ....").
32. For a history of federal disability policy in the United States, including the
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, see RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 41-59 (2d ed. 2001), and Robert L.
Burgdorf Jr., ''Substantially Limited" Protection !Tom Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions ofthe Definition ofDisability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409,
415-31 (1997).
33. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti
Discrimination Law: Mat Happened? My? And Mat Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 127-28 (2000) (discussing Congress's decision to utilize the
existing defmition of handicap in Section 504 as the definition of disability for the ADA).
34. See, e.g., Center & Irnparato, supra note 28, at 333 (noting that, when the ADA
was initially proposed in 1988, the National Council on the Handicapped, later renamed the
National Council on Disability, "asserted that the [Rehabilitation Act] approach was
problematic because it forced a plaintiff to identify as an individual with a disability
according to a medical model that emphasized the nature and scope of their 'impaim1ents'
and 'limitations"'); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 6 (stating

-·~------------------ ··-·----·------·--·------~----'
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disability when applying the Rehabilitation Act, and advocates had
eve1y reason to expect that the identical text would receive the same
treatment under the ADA. 35 The introduction of new definitional
language, ADA proponents feared, could result in the defeat of the
statute or lead to a more restrictive view of disability. 36
Thus, there was little, if any, discussion of the extent to which the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act either followed or rejected the medical
model, or, conversely, adopted an alternative view such as the social or
civil rights model. Indeed, scholars today have not reached a
consensus on the extent to which the ADA reflects one model or the
other. 37 These differing opinions likely result from the fact that
different models seem to be reflected in different parts of the statute.
The requirements for barrier removal in existing buildings, accessible
design in new construction, and reasonable accommodation, along
with notions of perceived disability, all reflect aspects of the social or
political rights views of disability discrimination. 38 However, the
definition of disability itself, ·with its individualized focus on
impairment, is seemingly tied to the medical model. 39
In its 2004 report, Righting the ADA, the National Council on
Disability, the staff of which were among the drafters of the ADA,
.asserted that the ''ADA embodies a social concept of discrimination'"'0
that the National Council on Disability's reco=endation to Congress regarding. disability
legislation rejected the approach of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because of its
emphasis on the medical model of disability).
35. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 9; Feldblum,
supra note 33, at 128-29. Nearly identical definitions appear in the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2000), and in the provisions prohibiting
discrimination in air transportation, see 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a)(l )-(3) (2000), as well as in
numerous state antidiscrimination statutes.
36. See Feldblum, supra note 33, at 91-92, 128-29.
37. Compare Diller, supra note 27, at 72 ("The ADA's embrace of the civil rights
model represents a break with the tradition of viewing the problems faced by people with
disabilities as being principally medical in nature."), with Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma, supra
note 28, at 273 ("While the new definition represents significant progress toward conceiving
disability as a civil rights construct; an unpacking of its terms reveals remnants ofthe medical
and social pathology models lurking just below the surface.").
38. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability'; 86 VA. L.
REv. 397, 433 (2000); Rower, Disability, supra note 27, at 1044 (noting that by "including
the reasonable acco=odation mandate," .Congress "embraced and endorsed the socio
political model of disability").
39. See O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 6-7 (arguing that modem disability policy,
including the ADA, reflects the "whole man theory" of disability, advanced by physicians in
the field of rehabilitative medicine, which posits that "disabled people could, by striving,
achieve normalcy").
40. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 109 (2004), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroornlpublications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf However, the agency
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while, at the same time, acknowledging that the Rehabilitation Act
definition of disability (which is the same as that found in the ADA)
"forced people to identify as a person with a disability according to a
medical model that emphasized the nature and scope of their
'impairments' and 'limitations.">41 The legal concept of "impairment"
has its origins in disability determinations by physicians who were
assessing a disability applicant's ability to work. 42 The persistence of
the term "impairment" created a tension in the ADA between notions
of disability as being, on the one hand, a severe medical condition
precluding employment, and, on the other, a disadvantage stemming
largely from a socially imposed set of barriers, both physical and
attitudinal.
Disability rights advocates have argued in the wake of pro
defendant rulings in ADA cases that the "domination of the medical
definition" of disability in legal contexts serves as a major impediment
to shifting notions of disability from a medical to a social or political
category. 43 While a requirement of medical proof does not necessarily
follow from the presence of the term "impairment," the importation of
the term to the ADA likely played into a long-standing series of
assumptions that led to judges' improper requirement of such evidence
to prove disability. 44 Under a traditional medical-based understanding
of disability, as long as the source of the problem of a person's
aclrnowledges that such a model is not explicit in the statute's language, and it proposes
amending the legislative findings supporting the statute to reflect such model. See id.
41. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF, supm note 10, at 6.
42. DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 109-11 (1984). Stone states that the
evolution of the means of evaluating impairment as a physician-based process was the result
of the medical establishment's concerted effort to ensure that disability determination was
their province, rather thari that of agency bureaucrats. I d. at 111-13.
43. See LINTON, supra note 5, at 11 (stating that society's continued emphasis on the
medical model of disability keeps the issue within the medical community and treats the
individual with the condition, instead of changing the social policies that restrict disabled
people); Crossley, supm note 21, at 668 ("A closer inspection of how agencies and courts
approach the threshold concept of impairment ... reveals that, by and large, the application
of the widely acclaimed civil rights statute reflects a medical model understanding of
disability."); Rovner, Disability, supra note 27, at 1044-45 ("Over the past decade ... the
success of the disability community in infusing the socio-political model of disability into
federal law has begun to be eroded by judicial decisions interpreting the ADA that appear to
be grounded in-and espousing-the medical model of disability."); c[ Margaret A. Winzer,
Disability and Society Before the Eighteenth Century: Dread and Despair, in THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 75, 84 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) ("Throughout history, the
medical aspects of disabilities have been paramount; other concerns relating to disability have
been secondary, where they have been considered at all.").
44: See, e.g., Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to
present any admissible medical evidence ofhis alleged disability) .
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limitations is regarded as residing altogether with the person's body (or
mind) as a defective, or abnormal, or pathological feature, there is no
need to look beyond the body itself for a solution.45 ·Such a view
suggests that the best way to overcome the limitations is to diagnose,
treat, and, if possible, cure the pathology. Where such efforts to
address the pathology fall short, they are nonetheless the extent of
what can be done, and there is no need to broaden the inquiry of the
source of limitations beyond the disabled person herself to any
potential external causes. It follows, then, that the medical-based
approach to disability would assume that medical providers serve as
the primary source of information regarding limitations experienced
by the individual.46 However, such an assumption is based not upon a
reasonable reading of the statute's text but rather on precisely the
notions about disability that lead to the disability-based discrimination
that disability scholars sought to dispel.

B

The Requirement of"IndividualizedInquiry" and Corroborating
Evidence UnderAgency Regulations and Jnte1pretive
Commentary

As noted above, the ADA itself provides no guidance on what
evidence is needed to meet the defmition of disability. Specifically,
the statute does not indicate to what extent, if any, medical evidence is
an indispensable requirement47 to establishing either the presence of
45. See Katharina Heyer, A Disability Lens on Sociolegal Research: Reading Rights
of Inclusion Jiom a Disability Studies Perspective, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 261, 265 (2007)
(reviewing DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W MONGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003)) (stating that under the
medical model of disability, the person's mental and physical impairments are responsible for
the disability).
46. See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the
Category ofDisability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 1, 8 (1999)
("Since [under the prevailing biomedical model] disability is understood as a scientific fact,
the entire domain-from determining its existence to prescribing its management-becomes
the exclusive province ofmedical professionals.");
47. By contrast, a few state statutes do contain specific references to a medical
evidence requirement. For example, Kentucky's statute, apparently the most restrictive in this
regard, defines physical disability as: "the physical condition of a person whether congenital
or acquired, which constitutes a substantial disability to that person and is demonstrable by
medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.130(2) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added). Other states' statutes provide a plaintiff
with a series ofmeans to prove disability, one of which is through the results of medical tests.
The New York statute's definition of disability states: "a physical, mental or medical
impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques ...." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21)
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impainnent or the substantial limitation on one or more major life
activities. 48 The legislative history is similarly silent regarding what
proof would be required to prove disability or whether there would be
a need for corroborating or medical evidence for meeting the
definition of disability. 49
With little in the statute to guide litigants and courts on the
application of the definition of disability, much of the analysis in
litigation has focused on the agency interpretive regulations, most
notably those promulgated in 1991 by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to apply to Title I of the ADA,
which prohibits discrimination in employmeneo
While these
regulations say little regarding the role of medical evidence in
evaluating claims, certain language in the regulations ultimately served ·
as a basis for many courts' requirement of medical evidence.5 1 Most
significant is the EEOC implementing regulations' emphasis on
individualized inquiry on the issue of disability. Specifically, the
regulations define the term substantially limits in the definition of
disabilitY 2 as follows:
(McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). New Jersey's definition of disability
includes: "any mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical,
psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of
any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2007)
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the use of the disjunctive "or," the case law ofNewYork
and New Jersey is generally regarded as imposing a requirement ofmedical evidence to prove
disability. SeeNAT'LCOUNCILONDISABILITY,POLICYBIUEF, supmnote 10, at 19,32 n.43, 33
n.45.
48. The regulations and cases set forth a clearer role for medical evidence in "direct
threat" affirmative defenses, an area that is outside the scope of this Article. Briefly stated,
the ADA permits employers' job qualifications to "include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the
workplace." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2007); accord 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000); see
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002). A requirement of medical
evidence to support such a defense is appropriate since the operation of the defense does not
turn on facts inherent to the plaintiff and her life but upon questions of contagion and risk
assessment that are properly within the· sphere of expert testimony. See Tory L. Lucas,
Disabling Complexity: The Americans with Disabilities Act of1990 and Its Interaction with
OtherFederalLaws, 38 CREIGHTONL. REV. 871, 898 (2005).
49. SeeFeldblum, supra note 33, at 126-34.
50. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (2007); Susan E. Dallas, Sutton: Use of
Mitigating Measures to Determine Disability Under the ADA, CoLO. LAW., Mar. 1999, at 59,
59 .(stating that the courts often look to the EEOC's interpretive guidance because the ADA
does not define "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits," or "major life
activity"). The statutory authority for the promulgation of interpretive regulations by the
EEOC is found at 42 U.S.C.- § 12116.
51. See, e.g., Rieger v. Or!or, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116-18 (D. Conn. 2006).
52. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2).
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1. The term substantially limits means:
i. Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perfonn; or
ii. Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or· duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.
2. The following factors should be considered in determining whether ·
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
i. The nature and severity ofthe impairment;
ii The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and .
iii The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or
long term impact of or resulting from the impairmene3

Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the advocates centrally involved
in the drafting and passage of the ADA, has observed: "[T]he EEOC
regulations introduced, for the first time in disability jurisprudence, the
concept that an individualized assessment would be required, in most
cases, to determine whether a person had a disability tinder the
ADA."54 This, Feldblum argues, is at odds with traditional notions of a
civil rights classification, which would "not necessarily require a
searching, individualized assessment of whether a person is really a
'handicapped individual,' any more than Title VII requires a searching,
individualized assessment of whether a plaintiff is really a woman or
an African-American."55 However, advocates were not especially
concerned with the. enactment of these regulations when they were
initially promulgated because court decisions applying the
Rehabilitation Act had rarely engageq in extensive analysis of the
definition of disability and had employed a broad view of the statute's
scope.56
The ADA regulations suggest, however, that specific information
is required regarding the impact of the impairment on the plaintiff,
along with comparative evidence regarding how that impact compares
with limitations expenenced by the average person in the general
population.57 This language leaves little question that a diagnosis alone
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G) (2007) (emphasis added).
54. Feldblum, supra note 33, at 135.
55. Id at 111.
56. Id at 137.
.
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G) (2007). A few courts have interpreted the reference in
the EEOC regulations to an individual's relative limitations as compared with the "general
population" to require expert medical testimony on not only the plaintiff's condition, but that
of others generally. See, e.g., Rieger v. Odor, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D. Conn. 2006)
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will be insufficient to establish disability, and signals that there are
several components of proofrequired to establish that an individual
meets the definition. The EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance" to the Title
I regulations notes:
The ADA and this part, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not
attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are "disabilities." The
determination of whether an individual has .a disability is not
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual.
Some impairments may be disabling for particular
individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or
disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the
impairment disabling or any number of other factors ....
The determination ofwhether an individual is substantially limited in
8
a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis. 5

Courts have followed this guidance and consistently applied the case
by-case approach to disability evaluations.59 Thus; although the nearly

· (finding that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that her difficulty in sleeping was greater
than that of the general population); Duncan v. Convergys Corp., No. 1:03CV35DAK, 2004
WL 2358104, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 13, 2004) (stating that the plaintiff failed to show that her
problems interacting· with others were any worse than those of the average person and so
concluding that no substantially limiting impairment existed). However, most courts
addressing the issue specifically have concluded that the reference to comparative limitations
in major life activities in the EEOC regulations does not necessarily require the use of expert
testimony. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 R3d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that because no comparative evidence is needed to support the plaintiff's claim,
jurors could evaluate testimony based on their "own life experience[s]"); Lowe v. Angelo's
Italian Foods, Inc., 87 R3d 1170, 1174 (lOth Cir. 1996) (stating that although comparative
evidence could be helpful for fact finder, it is not required where a plaintiff with multiple
sclerosis provided sufficient evidence that she could not lift items in excess of fifteen
pounds); Crutcher v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. Civ.A.04-0499-WS-M, 2005 WL 2675207, at
*10-11 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 2005) (finding that no comparative evidence is needed to
demonstrate substantial limitations arising from the plaintiff's inability to use an arm); EEOC
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98Civ. 2270(THK), 2002 WL 31011859, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2002) (holcliitg that there is no "rigid evidentiary requirement" of comparative
evidence, and that "[c]ommon sense and life experiences will permit fmders of fact to
determine whether someone who cannot sit for more than this period of time is significantly
restricted as compared to the average person"); Witt v. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d
1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001) (noting that no comparative evidence is needed to demonstrate
substantial limitation in activity ofwalking).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2007) (discussing section 1630.20)).
59. See, e.g., EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 R3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2001);
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 R3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1998); Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 130 R3d 893, 900 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1997); MacGovem v. Hamilton Sunstrand
Corp., 170 R Supp. 2d 301,309 (D. Conn. 2001); McClearyv. Nat'! Cold Storage, Inc., 67 R
Supp. 2d 1288, 1299 (D. Kan. 1999).
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identical definition of disability is used under the ADA as was used in
the Rehabilitation Act, courts approach the question of coverage much
differently. 60
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the appropriateness
of the individualized inquiry in Albertson S, Inc. v. Kirldngburg, where
the Court chastised the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for being "too quick to find a disability" in the case of a
plaintiff who had "20/200 vision in his left eye and monocular vision
in effect."61 The Court wrote: "[T]he Court of Appeals did not pay .
much. heed to the statutory obligation to determine the existence of
disabilities on a case-by-case basis. The [ADA] expresses that
mandate clearly by defining 'disability' 'with respect to an individual,'
and in terms of the impact of an impairment on 'such individual."'62
Specifically, this means that plaintiffs must "prove a disability by
offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own
experience . . . is substantial."63
This suggests that courts must engage in a searching analysis of
whether a person who self-identifies as "disabled," .in fact meets the
64
definition of disabled under the ADA.
The decision makes no
reference, however, to whether medical evidence is required to meet
the definition. 65
60. For a general discussion, see Feldblum, supra note 33, at 139-60. Feldblum notes
that "[i]n cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, courts rarely considered what it meant
for an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity, and rarely considered what made
a life activity sufficiently major." Id at 147. She suspects that part of the reason that the
issue of whether a plaintiff is disabled became a central issue in ADA litigation is due to the
large number of seminars for employers and other potential defendants that focused on each
aspect of the statute. Jd at 138-39.
61. 527 u.s. 555, 559, 564 (1999).
62. Jd at 566 (citations omitted).
63. Jd at 567.
64. For an insightful critique of this "individualized" inquiry approach by Professor
Wendy E. Parmet, see Individual Rights and Class Discninination: The Fallacy of 811
Individualized Determination ofDisability, 9 TEMP. PoL. & Crv. R:rs. L. REv. 283, 285 (2000).
She notes that the notion of an "individualized determination of disability" may initially
appear "to be consistent with the ADA's goals" of protecting individual rights. Jd at 284.
However, as she demonstratc;:s, this approach, which requires a retrospective determination of
whether the plaintiff is "disabled," in fact precludes the ADA from operating as a measure to
prevent discrimination and to improve access. Jd at 297. She also notes that many of the
problems of such approach "derive not from the fact of an individualized analysis but from
the rigor with which it is applied." Jd at 298. The imposition of a medical evidence
requirement discussed herein serves as one example of such unwarranted rigor.
65. The Supreme Court has never weighed in on whether or to what extent medical
evidence is required to establish disability. In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31
(1998), decided the year before Albertson's, the Court held that the HIV-positive plaintiff had
established that she was disabled under the first prong of the ADA's definition of disability.
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In interpretive materials, the EEOC has not taken a clear or
consistent approach ·to the role of medical evidence in such
individualized inquiries. One of the few references to such evidence in
the postenactment commentary on implementation of the ADA is
contained in the EEOC's 1997 EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Psyclllatric Disabilities. 66 In
discussing "substantial limitation" of a major life activity, the
Commission notes:
Relevant evidence for EEOC investigators includes descriptions of an
individual's typical level of functioning at home, at work, and in other
settings, as well as evidence showing that the individual's functional
limitations are linked to his/her impairment. Expert testimony about
substantial limitation is not necessarily required Credible testimony
from the individual with a disability and his/her family members,
67
friends, or coworkers may suffice.

This language unequivocally states that medical evidence is not
required per se. By contrast, however, in the part discussing the Title I
(employment) definition of the term "disability" contained in the
Commission's ADA Compliance Manual, a publication directed at
EEOC investigators, the EEOC suggests that medical documentation
may be necessary as part of an investigation if the claimed disability is
not "obvious" to the investigator, in which case the investigator is to
take steps to obtain medical documentation. 68 In a footnote, the agency
reminds investigators that medical documentation may also be
necessary to determine if the impairment results in a substantial
limitation of one or more major life activities. 69 Medical evidence may
There was no dispute that the plaintiff was in fact HIV-positive; rather, the controversy
focused on whether the HIV infection resulted in a substantial limitation of a major life
activity. Id at 641. It appears from the Court's decision that while the record was replete
with epidemiological research and other medical literature about the course and effects ofthe
HIV infection (which was supplemented by several amicus curiae briefs from various
medical organizations), there was no reference to medical evidence from the plaintiff's own
physician. Jd at 633-41. The plaintiff offered evidence, through her own statements, that
"HIV infection placed a substantial limitation on her ability to reproduce and to bear
children." Id at 637.
66. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 4 (1997) [hereinafter
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
67. Id (emphasis added).
68. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL
§ 902(b) (2001).
69.
A diagnosis is relevant to determining whether a charging party has an impairment.
It is important to remember, however, that a diagnosis may be insufficient to
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also be viewed as a good starting point for evaluating the duration and
impact of impairment.'0
While courts have relied heavily on the EEOC's interpretation of
the ADA when adopting the case-by-case individualized inquiry
described in the EEOC regulations and guidance, no courts have
referred to the above-quoted passages in their analyses of the need (or
lack thereof) to produce medical documentation to establish a prima
facie case. 71 Nonetheless, as discussed below, the language used by
courts, particularly with respect to notions of "corroboration" and
"obviousness," parallels the guidance language in the regulations and
manua1. 72

Ill. JUDGES' IMPOSITION OF A MEDICAL EVIDENCE REQUIRE:tv1ENT IN
DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE ADA .
The reported decisions applying the ADA have overwhelmingly
favored defendants, especially in the employment context. 73 Most
notably, and unexpectedly, a substantial number of plaintiffs' claims
are found io fall short of a prima facie case at the summary judgment
stage for failing to establish that the plaintiff is a person with a

determine ifthe charging party has a disability. Ari impairment rises to the level of
a disability when it substantially limits one or more major life activities. The
investigator, therefore, also should obtain available medical or other documentation ·
that describes the extent to which the impairment limits the charging party's major
life activities.
ld at 902.2(h) n.6; see id § 902.4(c).
70. Seeid § 902.4(d).
71. See, e.g., Marinelli v. City ofErie, 216 F.3d 354, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing the
EEOC's interpretation, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff's ADA claim failed because he
did not produce any medical evidence of his disability).
72. For example, in the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, the use of the word "and" between "the
individual with a disability" and the other categories of potential sources of information
suggests that the agency contemplated the need for some kind of corroborating evidence of
disability, but not necessarily medical evidence. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note
66, at4.
·
73. See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
AMER:ICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 69-95 (2005) [hereinafter COLKER, DISABILITY
PENDULUM]; AmyL. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the·ADA Tftle I-survey
Update, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513, 513 (2005); Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act· A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99,
100 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfallj; Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of
ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITYL. REP. 303,303 (2005).
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disability. 74 Several judges specifically note a failure to include expert
medical evidence in the summary judgment record as being the
primary deficiency in the evidence offered by a plaintiff to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 75
Court opinions follow several different approaches regarding the
role of medical evidence in meeting the definition of disability under
the ADA, either with respect to showing the presence of an impairment
or demonstrating that such impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. While judges apply a variety of approaches and rationales, the
results can be divided into three broad categories. First, led primarily
by the courts under the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second
Circuit, one group of courts imposes a requirement of expert medical
evidence to establish disability, with no apparent exceptions.76 A
second group takes a case-by-case approach to the requirement, basing
the need for medical evidence upon the nature of the claimed disability
and whether such condition is obvious and presumably within the
understanding of the jury. 77 The third group, comprised of the smallest
number of courts, states unequivocally that expert medical evidence is
notrequiJ;ed to establish a prima facie claim under the ADA. 78 Thus,
the dominant trend in the decisions is to assign a central and
indispensable role to· medical professionals in establishing disability
for purposes ofthe ADA.

74.
See Berg, supra note 46, at 2-3 (stating that the majority ofADA cases deal with
the issue of whether the plaintiff is disabled and most conclude that they are not); Feldblum,
supra note 33, at 93.
75. Implicit in these holdings is that the medical evidence offered by a plaintiff in
support of her claim of disability would need to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 as such evidence would be based upon "scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge," even if the evidence is offered through a plaintiff's treating
physician. FED. R. Evm. 701-02; see, e.g., Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751,
756 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that treating physicians are not exempt from the "expert"
testimony requirements of Rule 702). This requirement would therefore trigger the plaintiff's
obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the designation of expert
witnesses expected to testify at trial, and the furnishing of qualifications and other materials
during the discovery period. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(2); Musser, 356 F.3d 756-57 (holding
that a plaintiff must designate her treating physician as a potential expert witness during
discovery if such physician's testimony will be offered at trial).
76.
Seeinfianotes 79-95 and accompanying text.
77.
See infia notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
78.
Seeinfianotes 108-125 and accompanying text.
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Courts Requiring Expert Medical Evidence To Establish
Disability

The first line of cases holds that medical evidence is always
required to establish disability under the ADA and that absent such
evidence in a summary judgment or trial record, a plaintiff necessarily
fails to establish a prima facie case of disability. Based upon these
cases, even in the absence of any evidence generated by a defendant
controverting a plaintiff's claims of disability, a court can nonetheless
enter judgment for a defendant if it concludes that the plaintiff has
failed to make such a prima facie showing. 79 This line of cases
originated with a Rehabilitation Act case decided by the Second
Circuit, Heilweil. v. Mount Sinai Hospital, shortly after the effective
date oftheADA. 80 The court affirmed the entry of summary judgment
for the defendant-employer and noted briefly that among other
inadequacies in the plaintiff's record evidence, there was an absence of
medical evidence to support her claim that she could not work in
poorly vented areas as a result ofher asthma. 81
This opinion led to the rigid imposition of the requirement that
medical evidence is invariably required to establish disability under the
ADA in the district courts of the Second Circuit. For example, in
Douglas v. M'ctor Capital Group, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the defendant-employer's
motion for summary judgment on a plaintiff's claim that he was
terminated from employment after his employer discovered that he had
Legg-Perthes disease, spinal stenosis, and anxiety. 82 The primary basis
for the court's decision· (as articulated by the magistrate judge in a
recommended decision ultimately adopted by the court) was the
plaintiff's failure to offer admissible medical evidence to support his
claim of disability. 83 The plaintiff submitted an affidavit and deposition
testimony describing his conditions and their impact on his ability to
walk.84 The only medical evidence submitted by the plaintiff consisted
79. See, e.g., Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
80. 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994).
81. Id at 723.
82. 21 F. Supp. 2d at 380-81 (affirming recommended decision ofmagistrate judge).
83. Id at 383-84.
84. Id The magistrate judge's recommended decision describes the sworn evidence
offered by the plaintiff in support of his claim that he has substantial limitation in the major
life activity of walking as follows:
According to Douglas, his medical conditions affect his walking and
standing:
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physicians, which were excluded from
hearsay. 85 The court reasoned, relying upon
•''sev:er~l other cases, that "Douglas' [s] testimony as to the (alleged)
limits on his ability to walk, without supporting medical testimony,
simply is not sufficient to establish his prima facie case under the
ADA." 86 Stating it another way, and making it unequivocally clear that
medical evidence is an indispensable requirement for establishing a
prima facie case, the magistrate judge stated: ''Accordingly, I
recommend that defendants' summary judgment motion be granted for
Douglas' [s] failure to make out a prima facie case, that is, his failure to
submit any admissible medical evidence to demonstrate that his .
impairment substantially limits a major life activity."87
The courts following this line of cases did not analyze the issue of
requiring medical evidence until the 2003 opinion of the Southern
District of New York in Sussle v. Sirina Protection Systems Corp. 88
The plaintiff contended that he was substantially limited by Hepatitis C
and the medication he took to treat it in the major life activities of
·"h·p:;:-::;;.,,;.·r..-r•i'l·•·o•'"

ll~a\JLU.U..:J.:J~.u~v

I can't walk that far. I can't walk a half a block, a block at any time without
stopping for five, ten minutes, leaning to rest and then continue.
For that reason, he drives to work
·
Douglas expanded on this in his affidavit, under the heading "My Physical
Limitations and Restrictions":
·
28) As a result of the above conditions, I have the following limitations
and restrictions throughout all ofmy daily activities:
a) I cannot walk more than one-half a street block without having to stop
and wait for the pain or discomfort to subside.
b) I cannot run and I cannot lift anything.
c) I cannot put on my socks or tie my shoes. My wife does this for me.
d) I cannot function without substantial daily medication. Among many
drugs, I presently take three percocets per day for pain.
e) I cannot attend any sporting event for I cannot sit on hard chairs or
benches. I require special chairs and can endure only a limited sitting
time.
f)
I cannot walk anywhere without a cane to assist me. I own 15 canes.
g) I use crutches more frequently as the years go by, and now perhaps
three times per month. I own 3 sets of crutches.
h) In addition to a cane, I walk with a decided limp, which is apparent to
anyone who looks at me.
Id at 383 (internal citations omitted).
The court also noted apparently contradictory deposit_ion testimony regarding the extent
of plaintiff's limitations. Id However, such contradictions bear on the plaintiff's credibility,
not on whether there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact regarding the extent ofhis disability.
85. Id at 383-84. · The court gave the plaintiff a deadline to submit admissible
medical documentation in support of his claim, but he failed to do'so. Id at 381,384 n.4.
86. Id at 392.
.· '·
87. JC: at393.
' · ...
88. 269 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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reproduction, sexual relations, walking, concentrating, and climbing
stairs. 89 In support of his assertion, he submitted an affidavit and
deposition testimony describing "various limitations which he
attributed to Hepatitis C" and the prescribed treatmeneo
The court described the plaintiff's affidavit as contammg
"descriptions [that] were based wholly on his personal characteriza
tions of those limitations," and that he offered no medical evidence to
91
"substantiate the extent of his limitations." The court noted the long
line of cases in the district courts of the Second ·Circuit requiring
medical evidence and concluded: "These cases persuade us that where
the Plaintiff relies solely on his own testimony and fails 'to offer any
medical evidence substantiating the specific limitations to which he
claims he is subject due to his condition,' he cannot establish thathe is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA."92 "[T]o allow otherwise,"
the court reasoned, "would ensure that a plaintiff could defeat a motion
for summary judgment on the basis of conjecture or surmise."93 A
significant number of cases in other jurisdictions follow the Second
Circuit approacht accounting for many of the ADA claims that were

89. Id at 301. In that case, there was no issue regarding the showing of an
impairment for the first step of the analysis;· the court noted that it was well-settled in other
cases that Hepatitis C was an impairment for purposes of the ADA, and the defendants did
not dispute that finding. Id at 297.
90. Id at 301.
91. Id
92. Id at 302. The court observed, "[d]istrict courts in the Second Circuit have
repeatedly held that a plaintiff's personal testimony which describes the alleged limits that
affect a major life activity, 'without supporting medical testimony, simply is not sufficient to
establish his prima facie case under the ADA."' Id at 301 (quoting Douglas, 21 F. Supp. 2d
at392).
93. Id at 303.
94. See, e.g., Maulding v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 1992); Kaley v. Icon
Int'l Inc., No. IP99-1750-CHIK, 2001 WL 1781898, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 4, 2001); Cardwell
v. Bd. ofEduc., No. 00 C 7147,2001 WL 1064334, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001); Sabrah v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A.3:96-CV-2827-D, 1998 WL 792503, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Noy. 6,
1998); McGrawv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn. 1998); Baxter
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 96 C 2060, 1998 WL 603121; at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998); Estate
ofHirsch v. Nat'l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977,981-82 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Kalekiristos v.
CTS Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 657 (D.D.C. 1997), afftf, 132 F.3d 1481 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Kriskovic v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (E.D. Wise. 1996);
Buchanan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 95-1658 FMS, 1996 WL 723089, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1996); Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455, 464 (N.D. Miss. 1996);
Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 322, 326 (N.D. Miss. 1995); Aucutt v. Six Flags
Over Mid-Am., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 736, 744 (E.D. Mo. 1994), aff'd 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir.
1996).
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halted at the sunrrnary judgment stage for failing to meet the statutory
definition of disability. 95

B.

Courts Requiring Medical EVJdence in Some, but NotAl], Cases

A second line of cases holds that expert medical evidence is
sometimes needed to establish a prima facie case of disability, and that
the necessity depends upon the type of disability claimed and whether
it is found by the court to be within the comprehension of the average
lay juror. 96 In Katz v. City Metal Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit touched on the issue of the role of medical
95. A small group of cases purports not to impose a strict requirement of producing
medical evidence but, nonetheless, weighs the absence of such evidence heavily when
granting summary judgment for a defendant, effectively. resulting in the imposition of such
requirement. Such courts reason that a plaintiff's failure to produce medical evidence can
"cut against" a claim of disability, but do not rule against a plaintiff on that basis alone, as
done expressly by the courts following the Second Circuit approach discussed above. For
example, in Lakota v. Sonoco Products Co., the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts ruled that a plaintiff's failure to present medical evidence to· show the
existence of the claimed impairment (deep vein thrombosis) was only "a factor weighing
against his claim." No. Civ.A. 00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 596211, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 4,
2002); see also Dom v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 0N.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that the lack
of medical evidence in support of plaintiff's claims was "especially damaging ... given the
other weaknesses in plaintiff's claim of disability").
·
A few decisions also suggest that while there is a requirement for a plaintiff to point to
objective "corroborating" or "affmnative" evidence of disability in the record, such evidence
must not necessarily be expert medical testimony per se. See, e.g., Brandon v. Klingensmith
Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-1963, 2005 WL 3434141, at *4 C'N.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005)
(recognizing that there are cases where a plaintiff's testimony, in the absence of expert
evidence, was enough to support his or her disability claim under the ADA); Martyne v.
Parkside Med. Servs., No. 97 C 8295, 2000 WL 748096, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2000)
(holding that "objective evidence" is required to prove disability from depression). For
example, the lay observations of coworkers and family members may be sufficient in such
cases. See Brandon, 2005 WL 3434141, at *4 (noting that the plaintiff failed to submit
affidavits not only from her medical providers but also from "family members, health care
workers, friends, or others who assisted her with [major life] activities, or from any one who
witnessed her difficulties"). Such a comment echoes the suggestion in the EEOC
Enforcement Guidance on psychiatric disabilities that the statements of laypersons may be
relevant to determining whether a person is disabled. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,
supra. note 66, at 4. Nonetheless, in these decjsions as well, it appears that the absence of
medical evidence leads courts to dismiss a plaintiff's claims, though not explicitly stated, and
the Author has located no decisions in which the observations of lay witnesses, in the absence
of medical evidence, served as a basis to find a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
disability.
96. This approach is considered by some courts to be the ''majority" rule. Marinelli
v. City of Erie, 216 FJd 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2000) (referring to the "oft-cited" discussion of the
issue in Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996)); Gallimore v. Newman Mach. Co.,
301 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (stating that the failure to produce medical
evidence of a disability is not necessarily fatal to a plaintiff's claim of disability under the
ADA). However, that position appears to be held by the Second Circuit, based upon this
Author's survey and compilation of cases, for which a case chart is on file with the Author.
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evidence but only in dictum. 97 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he
was fired from his job as a result of a heart attack and subsequent
complications. 98 After the plaintiff's physician declined to appear at
trial on the scheduled date, the trial court denied the plaintiff's requests _
to offer the testimony in rebuttal or to continue the trial, and later
granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter oflaw.99
On appeal, the panel noted that while medical evidence was not
required to demonstrate that the plaintiff had an impairment on the
facts below, such evidence was required to establish that the plaintiff
was substantially limited in a major life activity from such
impairment. 100 The court cautioned: "There is certainly no general
rule that medical testimony is always necessary to establish
101
disability."
There may be "[s]ome long-term impairments [that]
would be obvious to a lay jury (e.g., a missing arm)," and the court did
not preclude the possibility that a plaintiff could "himself . . . offer a
description of treatments and symptoms over a substantial period that
would put the jury in a position . . . [to] determine that he did suffer
from a disability within the meaning ofthe ADA." 102
The Katz decision is remarkable in that it was one of the first to
suggest expressly that the requirement ofmedical evidence to establish
a prima facie case of disability should turn on the nature and, more
specifically, the "obviousness" of the claimed impairment (or its long
97.
87 F.3d at 32. Indeed, a number of district courts within the First Circuit have
ruled in favor of defendants, based at least in part upon plaintiffs' failure to offer medical
evidence in support of a claimed disability, with no reference to Katz. Se~ e.g., Poh v. Mass.
Corr. Officers Federated Union, No. 03-11987-RWZ, 2006 WL 1877089, at *2 (D. Mass.
July 7, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that he was disabled when the only
evidence offered in support of a substantial limitation on major life activities was "his own
.affidavit" and that he had specifically failed to submit medical evidence of such limitations);
Cruz Carrillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D.P.R. 2001) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving a substantiaLlirnitation on the major life activity
of reproduction because he was not a medical expert and did not present any objective
evidence in support ofhis position). ·
98. Katz, 87 F.3d at 28-29.
99.• Id at29-30.
100. Id at 31. The panel contrasted that case with Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17;
20-21 (1st Cir. 1993), in which the plaintiff claimed disability based upon "morbid obesity."
Katz, 87 F.3d at 31 n.4. In such a case, "it is not obvious to a lay jury that the condition
affects one of the bodily systems listed in the [EEOC] regulations;' and therefore, expert
testimony may be necessary to avoid judgment as a matter oflaw. Id
101. Idat32.
102. Id Ultimately, however, the panel concluded that it need not resolve the issue of
whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of ·~actual disability" because there
was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff was regarded as disabled, thus
meeting the third prong of the definition of disability, permitting the case to go to the jury.

Id
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term impact) and whether the l~itations from such impairment would
be understood by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony.
This approach was followed by the United States Court ofAppeals for
the Third Circuit in Marinelli v. Cjty ofEde, where the panel held that
the nature of the plaintiff's disability-a shoulder and arm injury
was within the comprehension of the jury. 103 Although the court
followed Katz in holding that the requirement of medical evidence
turns on the nature of the claimed impairment, the reasoning employed
actually runs somewhat counter to that in Katz. 104 The court
characterized the plaintiff's condition as "among those ailments that
are the least technical in · nature and are the most amenable to
comprehension by a lay jury."105 Since the plaintiff's claimed
limitations resulted almost entirely from pain, which is of course not
"obvious" to anyone other than the person experiencing it, the court
demonstrated little concern for issues of credibility or corroboration. 106
A handful of district courts have cited Katz, Marinelli, or both when
holding that a plaintiff's failure to offer expert medical evidence in
support of a claim ·of disability was not necessarily fatal, due to the
nature ofthe specific impairment at issue in the case. 107
As a practical matter, the difference between the approach tal(en
by this line of cases and that of the Second Circuit's Hdlwdl progeny
is largely a matter of degree. Defendants likely raise the issue of an
absence of medical evidence more often in cases where a disability is
103. 216 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the panel ultimately vacated the trial
court's judgment upholding the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on the basis that there was
insufficient evidence of substantial limitation of a major life activity. Id at 366.
104. See id at 360.
105. Id at 361.
106. See id (stating that because the plaintiff's arm and neck pain are readily
understandable by a lay person, his failure to present corroborating medical testimony is not
fatal to his disability claim under the ADA).
107. See, e.g., Gallimore v. Newman Mach. Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (musculoskeletal conditions); Dicino v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, No. Civ. 01-3206(JBS),
2003 WL 21501818, at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 23, 2003) (chronic pancreatitis resulting in back
and abdominal pain); Gourley v. Home Depot, No. CN.A.99-5728, 2001 WL 755102, at *3
n.6 (B.D. Pa. June 29, 2001) (hearing loss); Wolz v. Deaton-Kennedy Co., No. 98 C 6610,
2001 WL 699096, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2001) (fibromyalgia); Alitovski v. Elgin
Corrugated Box Co., No. 99 C 5018, 2001 WL 185479, *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2001)
(shoulder and wrist impairments); United States v. City of Denver, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1233,
1239-40 (D. Colo. 1999) (multiple plaintiffs with different disabilities). Also, the case law
under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) contains a similar approach to that
seen in the Katz-Marinelli line, in that the requirement of "expert medical evidence" can turn
on the extent to which a claimed impairment is "readily apparent," and "courts place a high
premium on the use and strength of objective medical testimony in proving the specific
elements of each test contained in the statute.". Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826,
835 (N.J. 2002).

tl'
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not obvious, and therefore, the defendant is challenging whether the
plaintiff falls within the scope of the ADA's protections, which does
not occur in every ADA case. It is improbable that the seemingly
inflexible approach would be in fact that exacting in all conceivable
cases. Despite their use of mandatory language, it is unlikely that
courts following the Heilweilline·would require a paraplegic plaintiff
who uses a wheelchair for mobility to provide medical evidence that
he is substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Thus,
the distinction between the approaches is largely a matter of how
broadly each line of cases regards the notion of an "obvious" disability.
C

Courts Holding that Medical Evidence Is Never Required To
Establish Disability

Finally, the third line of cases suggests that while medical
evidence can be used to bolster a claim of disability, its absence should
not be fatal to a plaintiff's prima facie case. The leading cases in this
line are Haynes v. Williams, decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2004/ 08 and Head v. Glacier
Northwest Inc., decided by the United States Court ofAppeals for the
109
Ninth Circuit the following year.
The Haynes panel's discussion of the issue of whether courts
should require ADA plaintiffs to offer expert medical evidence of
disability arose in the context of an employee's appeal from the entry
of summary judgment for the defendant-employer on claims that the
defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's
disability (idiopathic pruritis, a skin condition). and then terminated
him on the basis of the disability. 110 The district court concluded that
the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that he was substantially limited
in the major life activity of sleeping because he relied solely upon
"self-serving assertions" and failed to submit expert testimony in
support of such assertions. 111
On appeal, the panel affirmed the entry of summary judgment
but noted in dictum that the trial court erred in requiring the plaintiff to
112
Quoting the Supreme Court's
produce expert medical testimony.
108. 392 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
109. 413 F.3d 1053 (9thCir. 2005).
llO. HaJ71es, 392 F.3d at 480-82.
lll. Id at482 (quoting Haynes v. Williams, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2003)).
112. Id at 482, 485. The panel affirmed on the alternate basis for the entry of
judgment for the defendant, which was the plaintiff's failure to offer evidence that locations
other than his office triggered his symptoms. Id at 482-85 .
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language in Toyota Motor Manufactwing Kentucky, Inc. v. vf!illimns,
observing that the ADA requires plaintiffs to offer evidence of
disability ·"'in tenns oftheir OJil'lll expenemce,"' 113 the panel concluded:
"Whatever the comparative credibility of medical versus personal
testimony, a plaintiff's personal testimony cannot be inadequate to
raise a genuine issue regarding his 'own experience."' 114
The Ninth Circuit's Head decision follows a similar logic but
provides a somewhat more detailed discussion of the issue. 115 The trial
court granted partial summary judgment for the defendant on the basis
of the plaintiff's failure to present medical evidence in support of his
claim that he was disabled due to depression and bipolar disorder. 116
The plaintiff had provided a detailed affidavit describing the impact of
these conditions on his ability to sleep, interact with others, read, and
think. 117 On appeal, the panel stated unequivocally:
We hold that Ninth Circuit precedent does· not require comparative or
medical evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the impairment of a major life activity at the summary judgment stage.
Rather, our precedent supports the principle that a plaintiff's testimony
118
may suffice to establish a genuine issue of materialfact.
The appeals qourt also emphasized; however, that supporting
affidavits ''must not be merely self-serving and must contain sufficient
detail to convey the existence of an impairment." 119
A separate approach, somewhat related to this nonmandatory
view, followed by a few courts in ADA cases, is to take judicial notice
of certain medical facts, such as whether a condition is an
"impairment" or substantially limiting, rather than requiring a plaintiff
to provide expert medical testimony on such facts. 120 In these cases,
judicial notice substitutes for a physician's testimony, records, or
affidavit regarding a plaintiff's condition. 121 Thus, while the courts
113. Jd at 482 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198
(2002)).
114. ld
115. See Head v. GlacierNw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2005).
116. Jd at 1057.
117. Jd at 1059-62.
118. ld at 1058.
119. Jd at 1059.
120. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (''A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.").
121. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Tampa, 998 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(holding that the plaintiff's deposition testimony, together with the relevant excerpts from
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consider some medical facts to be important to the determination of
disability, they do not require plaintiffs to procure expert testimony
122
Tegarding their specific conditions. As_ these cases demonstrate, it
would seem appropriate and efficient that with respect to certain well
settled medical information, and at least for summary judgment
purposes (leaving it to the plaintiff to determine whether she wishes to
present a live witness to explain such information to the jury), a court
should take judicial notice of medical information contained within
indisputably authoritative texts 123 such as the Merck Manual. 124 The
summary judgment record on the issue of whether a plaintiff met the
definition of disability would thus contain the plaintiff's testimony of
her condition and its impact on her major life activities, supplemented
by explanations provided in medical references identified by the
plaintiff or by the court itself 125
The judicial notice approach would, of course, not satisfy many
courts, particularly those following the lead of the Second Circuit,
which requires expert medical testimony to confirm a plaintiff's
specific description of a medical condition and the resulting
126
limitations. In other words, medical texts cannot provide testimony
regarding the validity and veracity of an individual's specific claims of
authoritative medical texts, were enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether that condition substantially limited her major life activities).
122. See Harris v. H&W Contracting Co., 102 R3d 516,522-23 (11th Cir.l996)
(citing THE MERCK MANuAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1038-39 (Robert Berkow et al. eds.,
15th ed. 1987)); Wrjght, 998 R Supp. at 1402.
123. C£ Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(noting that pursuant to Rule 20l(b), a court may take judicial notice of "generally known
clinical definitions" such as those found on the website for the American Heart Association).
124. THE MERCK MANuAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY (Robert Berkow et al. eds.,
18th ed. 2006).
125. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reliance in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998), upon medical literature (without making explicit reference to employing judicial
notice) regarding HN infection to support a .finding that the plaintiff was substantially
limited in the rnajor life activity of reproduction, see supra note 65.
Bankruptcy courts frequently take judicial notice regarding medical information in cases
in which a debtor is seeking a discharge of an educational loan on the basis of "undue
hardship;' 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007), and specifically on the basis
of a disability. The conditions include multiple sclerosis, attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, glaucoma, and bipolar disorder, and courts have relied upon a number of different
sources for the information. See Hertzel v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 329 B.R. 221, 230-33
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005) (stating that in order to prove "undue hardship" some corroborative
evidence ofplaintiff's condition was necessary).
126. See, e.g., Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to
submit admissible medical evidence of an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity). ·
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disability. However, as explored below, these courts' insistence on
.corroborating medical evidence as a prerequisite to establishing
disability is contrary to the application of summary judgment
principles, as outlined by the Supreme Court and is based upon
misplaced concerns regarding ADA plaintiffs' motives.

N. THE STATED RATIONALE OF THE REQUIREMENT OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE-JUDGES' IMPROPER INSISTENCE ON
"CORROBORATION" OF PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS

Judges' insistence on the presence of expert medical testimony in
the record is based upon improper reasoning and imposes an
unwarranted and inappropriate burden on ADA plaintiffs. More is at
stake in these cases than just the practical lesson that when faced with
a defendant's summary judgment motion, a plaintiff's attorney should
be sure to obtain an affidavit from a doctor that supports her client's
allegations of impairment and resulting limitations. 127 The approaches
followed by courts requiring such evidence superimpose requirements
on ADA plaintiffs that have no basis in the statute itself and misapply
the core principles of summary judgment analysis.
Many court decisions explicitly refer to the inadequacy of a
plaintiff's "self-serving" affidavit or deposition testimony standing
alone to establish disability and the corresponding necessity ofmedical
evidence to corroborate or support a plaintiff's assertions of
disability. 128 These decisions do not suggest that a plaintiff cannot offer
evidence of a disability in opposition to a summary judgment motion,
but, rather, state that such evidence will be insufficient as a matter of
law to establish a prima facie case unless it is also accompanied by
evidence from a physician validating what she professes to be her
127. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: My Are So
Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better
Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Calker, 19 REv. LITIG. 505, 523 (2000). In the
authors' view, the failure to produce sufficient medical evidence and pursuing only one type
ofADA claim are strategic errors on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys. ld
128. See, e.g., LaBrecque v. Sodexho USA, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 100, 109-10 (D.
Mass. 2003) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's
assertions of disability were corroborated by medical records); Baerga v. Hosp. for Special
Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL 22251294, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003)
(granting defendant's motion for surnmaiy judgment where plaintiff offered only self-serving
uncorroborated testimony about the impact of her medical conditions on the major life
activity of sleeping); cf. Reynolds v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., No. 1:02-1 039-CV-JDT-TAB, 2003
WL 23220760, at *5, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2003) (requiring some corroborating evidence of
disability but not medical evidence per se); Martyne v. Parkside Med. Servs., No. 97 C 8295,
2000 WL 748096, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2000) (stating that objective evidence is needed to
prove a disability under the ADA, but that medical evidence is not required in every case).
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disability. 129 Other courts characterize the evidentiary failing of a
plaintiff's claim as being a lack of "objective" evidence of disability,
and that such evidence is needed to corroborate a plaintiff's description
of a substantially limiting impairment. 130 Many courts hold that
medical evidence is required where a plaintiff's condition is not one
that the jury can readily assess without having to rely solely upon a
plaintiff's subjective description of the impairment and the resulting
limitations. 131 Thus, the notion of "obviousness" of disability is also
tied to the issue of corroboration. However characterized, none of the
courts' explanations for the requirement of medical evidence to
establish disability withstands close analysis.

A.

CourtDecisions Improperly Import the Substantive Law ofOther
Causes ofAction To Hold ThatPlaintiffs' Testimony Alone is
Insufficient To Establish Disability Under the ADA

The court opinions holding that "self-serving" statements of a
plaintiff alone are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a genuine
issue of material fact often base such holdings upon non-ADA case
law that appears to require corroborating evidence of a plaintiff's
claims. 132 An examination of the issues presented in the precedents
129. This question is very different from that discussed below regarding who is .
competent to offer testimony on medical conditions. See inita notes 303-332 and
accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 95-1658 FMS, 1996 WL
723089, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) ("Plaintiff failed to produce any objective medical
evidence demonstrating a restriction of either his short or long term work capacity in any
job."); Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 322, 326 (N.D. Miss. 1995) ("He has
presented absolutely no medical reports or other objective evidence substantiating his claim
that his injury and subsequent surgery left him with a condition which rises to the level of a
physical impairment.").
131. See, e.g., Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996) (heart condition);
Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-1963, 2005 WL 3434141, at *5
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (fibromyalgia); Ashton v. AT & T Corp., No. Civ.A.03
CV3158(DMC), 2005 WL 2320899, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2005) (anxiety and agoraphobia);
Lakota v. Soncoco Prods. Co., No. Civ.A. 00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 596211, at *3 (D. Mass.
Apr. 4, 2002) (deep vein thrombosis); Dorn v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 (WD. Pa.
2002) (learning disorder).
132. See, e.g., Baerga, 2003 WL 22251294, at *5 ("Plaintiff offers only self-serving,
uncorroborated statements to support his contention that his panic disorder substantially
limits his ability to sleep, think and interact with others."); Dam, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 623
(holding that a plaintiff's own self-serving evidence was not enough to show that he was
substantially limited in a major life activity when the alleged acts of discrimination occurred);
Cardwell v. Bd. ofEduc., No. OOC7147, 2001 WL 1064334, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001)
(granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to submit
any corroborating evidence, other than his own self-serving affidavit, to prove his substantial
limitation of a major life activity).

- - - - - -----------------------·-·
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themselves, however, demonstrates that this use is misplaced. To begin
with, any evidence offered by a plaintiff, whether in affidavit,
deposition, or otherwise, in support of her claim is, by ddinition, self
serving to at least some extent. 133 But that does not render the evidence
necessarily defective or inadmissible. While historically, a party to a
civil matter was not competent to provide testimony in his or her own
case, that rule was eventually abolished in English common law and
134
has no basis in modem American jurisprudence.
Similarly, the
ancient legal principle of testis unus-testis nullus (one witness-no
witness), which states that a single witness is effectively no witness at
all for purposes of proving a fact in court proceedings, has been long
135
abandoned.
Rather, under contemporary American law, for purposes of both
summary judgment and trial, an individual witness's account
(including that of the plaintiff who has a direct financial stake in the
133. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGI;ISH LANGUAGE 1581 (4th ed.
2000), defines self-serving as follows: "1. Serving one's own interests, especially without
concern for the needs or interests of others. 2. Exhibiting concern solely for one's own
interests: a speech :fiiJJ ofself-serving comments." ·
134. The Supreme Court described the abolition of this rule in Ferguson v. Georgia,
365 U.S. 570,573-77 (1961). The Court noted that:
The disqualification of parties as witnesses characterized the common law for
centuries. Wigmore traces its remote origins to the contest for judicial hegemony
between the developing jury trial and the older modes of trial, notably
compurgation and wager of law. Under those old forms, the oath itself was a
means of decision. Jury trial replaced decision by oath with decision of the jurors
based on the evidence of witnesses; with this change "[T]he party was naturally
deemed incapable of being such a witness." Incompetency of the parties in civil
cases seems to have been established by the end of the sixteenth century. In time
the principal rationale of the rule became the possible untrustworthiness of the
party's testimony; for the same reason disqualification was applied in the
seventeenth century to interested nonparty witnesses.
Jd at 573 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
135. See In re Roe's Will, 143 N.Y.S. 999, 1003 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1913) ("In old
testamentary law and in the Ecclesiastical Courts one witness was no witness, 'testis unus,
testis nullus,' or, as the jurist Loysel said, 'The voice of one is the voice of none.' This rule of
Hebraic origin dominated the whole procedure of the Middle Ages, and was very potent in
the canon Law and in the Ecclesiastical Courts of England."); see also Lawrence Douglas,
Wartilne Lies: Seeming The Holocaust in Law and Literature, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 367,
386 (1995) ('The medieval canonical stricture of testis unus, testis nullus (one witness, no
witness), though formally abandoned in modem rules of evidence, suggests an attitude that
continues to inform contemporary jurisprudence, one that enfolds· all testimony in
suspicion."); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value ofFace-to-Face Con:ITontations, 40 U. FLA.
L. REv. 863, 912 n.l63 (1988) ("Sir William Holdsworth observed that during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, English law required evidence of two witnesses for a conviction of
some offenses. This rule of 'testis unus testis nullus,' however, had a relatively small effect on
modem English law. The .result was an emphasis on the proper weight ofthe evidence rather
than the number of witnesses who swore to a fact." (citations omitted)).
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account) may be sufficient to support .a finding against the defendant
assuming that the witness can present admissible testimony on each
136
element of the claim. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Supreme Court
emphasized that summary judgment is appropriate only where a party
who will have the burden of proof at trial "fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case." 137 In other words, there must be "a complete failure of
proof" concerning such an essential element. 138 Reference to the
inadequacy of "self-serving" testimony is only appropriate in cases
where, for example, the plaintiff is making conclusory statements
concerning a defendant's motives, where a specific motive comprises
one of the necessary elements of a claim as a matter of substantive law,
without any actual evidence of such motives. 139 Another way of stating
the infirmity of the testimony is that the plaintiff has no personal
knowledge of the facts asserted (such as a defendant's belief and
intent), and, therefore, the proffered affidavit or deposition testimony
does not "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." 140
Specifically, such speculative assertions would be the appropriate basis
to sustain a defendant's trial objection raised under Federal Rule of
141
Evidence 602. Thus, the shortcoming of such proffered evidence is
not that it is a statement by aplaintiffin support of her own claim, but
that a plaintiff is trying to win a case by offering nothing more than her
own interpretation of events, includillg the allegedly impermissible and
undisclosed motives of others. 142

136. See C. A. J. COADY, TESTIMONY: APIDLOSOPIDCALSTUDY 34 (1992) ("Corrobora
tion has an important role in the assessment of testimony but in modem English law
uncorroborated testimony is perfectly acceptable as evidence, except for some categories of
witness (such as unsworn children). This was not always so in English law nor is it so today
in Scottish law and canon law where the tradition of Roman law is strong and the maxim
testis unis, [sic} testis nullus is the rule.").
137. 477 u.s. 317,322 (1986).
138. ld at 323.
139. See, e.g., Santiago v. Canon U.S.A.; Inc., 138 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) ("'A
plaintiff [claiming discrimination] "may not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and
tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory
animus.""') (quoting Coyne 'v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992)).
140. FED.R.Crv.P. 56(e).
141. FED. R. Evro. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter.'-').
142. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.
2000) ("[A] 'party's own affidavit, containing relevant information of which he has first-hand
knowledge, may be self-serving, but it is nonetheless competent to support or defeat
summary judgment."' (quoting Cadle Co. v. Haynes, 116 F.3d 957,961 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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This :important distinction, however, is lost in the application of
this case law to require the use of corroborating medical evidence to
support a plaintiff's claim of actual disability under the ADA, to which
a defendant's beliefs and motives are wholly irrelevant. An example of
this misplaced use ofprecedent is a decision ofthe United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, McPhaul v. Board of
Commissioners. 143 The panel affirmed the entry of summary judgment
for the employer-defendant on an ADA claim brought by a woman
who claimed that she was entitled to reasonable accommodation by her
employer for her fibromyalgia. 144 The plaintiff presented evidence that
her symptoms included "fatigue, insomnia, shortness of breath and
muscle pain, including sore hands and joints" and "that her condition
made it difficult for her to concentrate, bathe, walk, write and work." 145
The panel noted the absence of medical evidence regarding the
potential benefits of the requested accommodations and that "[a]ll that
McPhaul can present in support of her reasonable accommodation
claim is her own self-serving testimony, and in this case, that is just not
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she is a qualified individual
146
with a disability under the ADA." The authority offered for that
holding was an earlier decision by that court, Slowiak v. Land
0 'Lake~ Inc.,. which held that "[s]elf-serving affidavits without factual
support in the record will not · defeat a motion for summary
147
judgment."
However, the earlier quote arose in an antitrust case
alleging price fixing, a completely different context in which a plaintiff
is required to offer admissible evidence of the defendant's alleged
conspiracy to set prices to establish one ofthe elements ofthe claim. 148
Thus, the question of whether evidence in the record beyond the
statements of a plaintiff is required to create a genuine issue of
material fact turns upon the substantive law of the plaintiff's particular
claims-either as set forth by statute or developed through case law
143. 226 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2000).
144. ld at 562,-564.
145. Id at 562.
146. Id at 564. The McPhaul case is one ofthe few considered in this Article in which
the failure to include medical evidence in the record is specifically noted with respect to the
question of reasonable accommodation, in addition to meeting the definition of disability.
See id The appellate panel noted the absence of corroborating medical evidence with respect
to both issues. ld at 563-64.
147. 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1993).
148. Id at 1295-97. The panel followed the admonition against "self-serving"
statements standing alone with a quote from another decision: '"[A] plaintiff's speculation is
not a sufficient defense to a summary judgment motion."' Id at 1295 (alteration in original)
(quoting Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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not on the general procedural rules regarding summary judgment. In
contrast to the antitrust laws at issue in Slowiak, the ADA definition of
disability under the "actual disability" category requires no evidence
beyond that which would be lmown firsthand by the plaintiff. 149 Nor is
there any basis in the ADA text or regulations, discussed above, 150 to
require corroboration of any fact within a plaintiff's own lmowledge in
order to survive summary judgment. 151 The distinction is between
testifying about the "self," as noted by the D.C. Circuit in Haynes v.
Williams, and making speculative assertions about others' motives
("He fired me because I'm deaf") and actions. 152

B.

The Requirement ofCorroborating Medical Evidence Runs
Contrary to Swnmary Judgment Principles Regarding Credibility
Detenninations

The decisions based upon the inadequacy of "self..,serving".
testimony of facts within one's own lmowledge and experience are not
only incorrect as a matter of substantive law but are als.o entirely
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent on the proper approach to
issues of credibility presented in a motion for summary judgment. In
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., another case in the 1986 Celotex
trilogy of cases on summary judgment, the Court held: "'[A]ll that is
required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual
dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial."' 153 The Court stressed that "at
the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
.determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." 154 Accordingly,
the Court noted:
Credibility detemrinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)_. In contrast, some evidence of an employer's
subjective belief would be required in cases brought by plaintiffs who allege that they were
subjected to discrimination based upon a record of disability or perceived disability. See
Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999).
150. See supra notes 12-72 and accompanying text.
151. See American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified in scattered sections of29, 42,47 U.S.C.); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2007).
152. 392 F.3d 478,482 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
153. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (quoting First Nat'! Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,
391 u.s. 253,288-89 (1968)).
154. Id
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judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence ofthe nonmovant is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. 155
Accordingly, assuming that in resisting summary judgment an ADA
plaintiff offers admissible evidence 156 describing an impairment that
substantially limits her in one or more major life activities, no further
analysis is needed of whether the plaintiff has satisfied the definition
of disability for summary judgment purposes.
Indeed, this was precisely the analysis followed in both the
Haynes and Head opinions. However, by requiring expert medical
evidence in addition to a plaintiff's own statements, other courts have
improperly blurred the important line-emphasized repeatedly by the
· Supreme Court-between providing sufficient evidence and providing
persuasive evidence. 157 There is a distinction between the problem of
conclusory, nonspecific evidence, which is not sufficient to create an
issue of fact, and "self-serving" or uncorroborated evidence, which is
merely potentially (but not necessarily) unconvincing evidence. If a
plaintiff does not offer expert medical testimony regarding disability at
trial, then she perhaps runs the risk of not persuading the jury that she
is disabled. But, as the decisions of the Celotex trilogy and their
progeny make clear, the role of the trial coun at summary judgment is
not to engage in such weighing ofthe evidence but only to determine if
there is sufficient evidence upon which a jury couldbase a verdict. 158
Judges' improper approach to summary judgment in ADA cases
stands in marked contrast to the case law of the Rehabilitation Act,
under which federal courts routinely reserved factual issues regarding
whether a plaintiff was disabled for juries. 159 The Supreme Court
specifically noted in School Board v. Arline that the issue of whether
an individual was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act was a factual, not legal, question. 160 Under the ADA, however,
'judges are routinely deciding fact-intensive cases without sending

155. • ld at 255 (emphasis added).
156. See in:ITa notes 260-332 and accompanying text for a discussion of the special
issues involving admissibility.
157. See, e.g., In re Estate of Swan, 293 P.2d 682, 689 (Utah 1956) (stating that a
party's burden of persuasion is to convince the fact finder that the evidence is in his favor,
while to meet its burden ofproduction, the party only needs to make a prima facie showing of
the facts).
158. · SeeCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986).
159. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 73, at 111-12 (stating that under the
Rehabilitation Act, juries determined whether someone was disabled and Congress therefore
intended juries to have the same role under the ADA).
160. 480 u.s. 273,287 (1987).

I
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·them to the jury." 161 Professor Ruth Golker's analysis of outcomes in
ADA employment discrimination cases revealed that over 93% of
reported decisions yielded results that are favorable · for the
defendant. 162 She concluded that "the summary judgment tool was a
device used with great frequency at the trial court level to dispose of
ADA cases in favor of defendants," 163 and attributed the bulk of ADA
decisions unfavorable to the plaintiff as being evidence of courts
"abusing the summary judgment device by creating an impossibly
high threshold of proof" for ADA plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment. 164 Courts' improper requirement of medical evidence at the
summary judgment stage serves as one of the most significant causes
ofthese lopsided results.
Indeed, imposing a demanding evidentiary standard of
"corroborating" evidence in ADA claims is inconsistent with the
approach taken in other antidiscrimination statutes, such as the
prohibition on religious discrimination found in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which, like the ADA, requires certain reasonable
accommodations in the employment setting. 165 As part of a prima facie
case alleging an employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a

161. Colker, Windfall, supmnote 73, at 116.
162. See id at 126.
163. Id
164. CaLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supm note 73, at 115. As a side note, this
discussion takes place with a backdrop of a broader question about summary judgment in the
federal courts, particularly in' civil rights litigation, which has been the focus of much recent
commentary. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication
Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REv. 103, 105-106 (2005) (arguing that
federal courts have failed to adhere to the principle that summary judgment is not appropriate
when a plaintiff's employment discrimination case is "weak but winnable"); Arthur R. Miller,

The Pretrial Rush to Judgment· Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 982, 984-85 (2003) (arguing that courts have extended the use of summary judgment
and the motion to dismiss to resolve disputes that are better left to trial and the jury); Martin
H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the. Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1348 (2005) (arguing that changes in the law of summary
judgment have led to a decrease in federal trials). One comin.entator referred to summary
judgment as the "new fulcrum of federal civil dispute resolution." Paul W. Mollica, Federal
Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 141, 141 (2000). Two recent essays
offer provocative arguments in favor ofthe wholesale elimination of summary judgment. See
John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 522, 526-27
(2007) (arguing that abolishing summary judgment would make court systems fairer and
more efficient); Suja A Thomas, My Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REv. 139, 140 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitutional because it denies a
party his or her Seventh Arnendnlent right to a trial by jury).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eG), 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
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religious practice, a plaintiff must establish the "sincerity" of her bona
fide religious views. 166 As one court explained:
In order to satisfy this element, the plaintiff must demonstrate both that
the belief or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held....
. . . The element of sincerity is fundamental, since "if the religious
beliefs that apparently prompted a request are not sincerely held, there
has been no showing of a religious observance or practice that conflicts
167
with an employment requirement."

Thus, the required showing is in many ways analogous to meeting the
definition of disability in a claim for a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA.
However, the two protected categories receive vastly different
treatment in terms of required evidence to establish a prima facie
claim. Employee-plaintiffs are not required to provide proof of
religion, beyond their own statements, to establish the sincerity of their
beliefs. 168 Courts consistently hold:
The finding on this issue [of sincerity] generally will depend on the
factfinder's assessment of the employee's credibility. Credibility issues
such as the sincerity of an employee's religious belief are quintessential
fact questions. As such, they ordinanly shoUld be reserved "for the
factfinder at tdal, not for the court at summaryjudgment" 169
•
·
Further, there is no requirement for a sworn statement or other
evidence from a clergyperson or other individual attesting to the
frequency of attendance at worship services or other "objective"
indicators of sincerity. 170 No doubt, such evidence would bolster a
plaintiff's claims and would perhaps make the difference at trial
between whether the fact finder does or does not believe her sincerity.
But courts properly reserve that question for fact finders.
There is no reason why claims of reasonable accommodation on
the basis of disability should_ be subjected to any different treatment.
166. EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad, 279 R3d 49, 55-56 (1st Cir.
2002).
167. Jd at 56 (quoting EEOC v. Ilona ofHungary, Inc., 108 R3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir.
1997)).
168. See id. (stating that the determination of whether a religious belief is sincerely
held is generally an issue ofthe employee's credibility for the fact finder to determine).
169. Jd (quoting Simas v. First Citizen's Fed. Credit Union, 170 R3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.
1999)) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Ilona ofHungary, 108 R3d at 1575.
170. Cf. Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 R3d 679, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of sincerity of belief that she
needed to undertake a pilgrimage at a specific time because of the absence of specific
statements in her own testimony regarding the "temporal mandate" ofthe pilgrimage).

-·~--~~~-~~---·-------------------~----------·
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One reaction to this view might be that religion is different in that
employers (and courts) must be careful not to invade the privacy of
one's religious practice by involving a clergyperson or others in the
inquiry. But why should the privacy, and most particularly the medical
privacy, of people with disabilities be any <llfferent? The different
attitudes toward proving disability versus religion suggest that courts
(and therefore society) have more concern about people who falsely
"claim disability" than those who falsely claim to ha:ve a particular
belief. Religious individuals are perhaps regarded more like "normal"
people and are not associated with those who seek government support
or workers' compensation or similar claims. Thus, we do not generally
question their credibility. But a potential plaintiff's incentive to
deceive is identical in any kind of reasonable accommodation claim,
and the respective roles of the court and the jury in determining the
veracity of a plaintiff's claims should be consistent as wel1. 171
171. As a final note for purposes of the analysis offered here, it should be
aclmowledged that in some ofthe opinions reviewed in Part III, it is difficult to determine the
specific failing in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence. It may well have been that the
only testimony offered was a single-line affidavit to the effect of "I have _ _ and it
substantially limits me in the daily activity of'--'" with nothing more. While an argument
could. be made that nothing in the ADA requires extensive, detailed testimony about
disability, there is clear consensus of the courts, relying in large part on the EEOC's
regulations and other interpretive materials regarding the need for individualized assessment
of disability, that some description of an impairment and resulting limitations is needed to
establish disability. See Feldblum, supra note 33, at 158-59. This is the case despite the fact
that under the case law developed with the use of the identical definition of disability under
the Rehabilitation Act, such assertions likely would have been accepted on all sides as
sufficient to establish disability. See id at 106 ("[C]ourts hearing Section 504 cases rarely
tarried long on the question ofwhether a plaintiff was 'really a handicapped individual."').
Thus, in some cases, there may be an overall paucity of specific evidence of a disability,
and the problem lies with the content (or lack thereof) ofthe plaintiff's statements-that they
were conclusory and not sufficiently specific-and not necessarily the absence of medical
evidence. In other words, there may be certain cases where, if the plaintiff had offered more
detailed admissible evidence of the effects of an impairrllent or a substantial limitation of a
major life activity, the absence of medical evidence should not have been fatal or perhaps
even noteworthy. Furthermore, an outcome could also depend upon whether the absence of
detailed evidence was raised in a defendant's summary judgment briefing. In many such·
cases, courts invoke an oft-cited mandate that mere evidence of a diagnosis is insufficient to
establish disability. One example is Machin-Rodn"guez v. C & C Partnership Cpca. Cola
Puerto Rico, where the plaiittiff alleged that he was disabled due to depression. No. Civ.03
1746 SEC, 2005 WL 2293574, at *1 (D.P.R. Sept. 20, 2005). The district court noted, in
addition to the inadequacy of the medical evidence provided (which "simply states his
diagnosis and treatment"), the failure of the plaintiff's affidavit "to describe or provide any
specific information on the effects, let alone the 'substantial' effects, that his diagnosis has or
has had on his major life activities." ld at *4; accord Burks v. Wise. Dep't ofTransp., 464
F.3d 744, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2006); Stein v. Ashcroft, 284 F.3d 721, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2002);
Cook v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 03 Civ.3926LAKFM, 2005 WL 2429422, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005); Dom v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622 (WD. Pa. 2002);
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As demonstrated above, there are a significant number of cases in
which, despite a plaintiff's detailed testimony or affidavit regarding a
medical condition and its impact on her life, a court has found such
evidence insufficient as a matter of law to generate a genuine issue of
material fact. 172
Such decisions demonstrate a fundamental
misapplication of the ADA and the rules of summary judgment.
Indeed, in few ofthe cases cited or discussed in Part III do the courts in
fact engage in an analysis of the proper approach to summary
judgment on questions of disability under the ADA. Rather, they
merely cite to one (or several) of the earlier cases that impose the
medical evidence requirement, as if it were a matter of settled ADA
jurisprudence. 173 The result is the creation of a significant body of case
law, based upon a wholly erroneous rationale, which has been used to
block numerous ADA plaintiffs' claims from proceeding to trial.

V.

THE UNSTATED RATIONALE-THE PHYSICIAN AS GATEKEEPER

AGAINST MALINGERING
If requiring medical evidence to corroborate a plaintiff's
allegation that she is disabled has. no basis in the statute's text and is at
stark variance with proper summary judgment practice, as explained in .
the preceding Part, why are courts imposing this additional evidentiary
burden on ADA plaintiffs specifically? The reasons likely stem from a
common ongm: namely, courts' concern that those "claiming
disability" may be malingering by exaggerating or even inventing the
claimed disability. 174 This preoccupation with malingering is revealed

Charlotten v. May Dep't Stores Co., No. 97 Civ.8962(HB), 1998 WL 635547, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 1998); Ivaniuc v. Hauer Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 94 CV 5909(SJ), 1998 WL 57077,
at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1998). Courts are ·not always careful to note the important
distinction between the quantum of evidence of disability and the quality of such evidence.
172. See, e.g., Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-1963, 2005
WL 3434141, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (granting the defendant~s motion for
summary judgment despite the plaintiff'S' detailed answers to interrogatories describing how
her daily life was affected by her fibromyalgia); Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 R Supp.
2d 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment
because the only medical evidence that the plaintiff presented of his disability was two
unsworn and inadmissible letters from physicians); supnmotes 82-87 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Douglas, 21 R Supp. 2d at 392 (citing several decisions requiring the
plaintiff to produce medical evidence of a disability).
174. Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos has suggested that a preoccupation with feigned
disability may be behind lower courts' use of the term "truly disabled" when ruling against
plaintiffs deemed to fall outside that category. Bagenstos, supra note 38, at 469-70. Indeed,
such concern may serve as the source for many overly restrictive interpretations ofthe statute,
as well as for the improper imposition of evidentiary requirements, as is argued here.
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by courts' persistence in assigning physicians the role of screening out
specious claims of disability. 175
Courts that require expert medical testimony as part of a prima
facie case are essentially delegating credibility determinations to
physicians. 176 If there is no corroboration of a plaintiff's own
description of her disability, then these courts assume the plaintiff's
assertions of limitations may be discounted to the point that they are
effectively nonexistent. 177 Further, if a plaintiff's accounting of her
disability is at variance with what is described by her physician, this is
not seen as a disputed issue of fact-thus a credibility determination to
be resolved at trial by the jury-but as a failure to satisfy the
requirements for a prima facie case. 178 It is as if she offered no
testimony at all. A treating physician's deposition testimony (in
response to questions posed' by the defendant's attorney, most likely)
may include statements to the effect that the physician is aware of no
reason why the plaintiff could not work or perform the major life
activity that the plaintiff alleges to be impaired. 179 For example, in
Baerga v. Hospital for Special Surgery, the trial court noted that
although the plaintiff alleged to have difficulty sleeping, there was no
175. See, e.g., Sussle v. Sirina Protection Sys. Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 285, 302
(S.D.N.Y 2003) (holding that a plaintiff needs medical evidence to prove that he is disabled
for purposes oftheADA).
176. In other contexts, courts generally exclude expert testimony where the primary
purpose of such evidence is to bolster the credibility of a witness. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL.,
THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE§ 1.5, at 23-24 (2004)
(noting that federal courts often rely upon the "helpfulness criterion of Rule 702" to exclude
expert testimony on credibility); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation
of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W REs. L. REv. 165, 166 (1989) ("Jurors are expected to
make credibility decisions based on their common sense, which is also termed intuition or
experience. This concept of common sense is considered essential to the jury's task. When
jurors exercise· their common sense in evaluating a witness' testimony, a full and fair
credibility determination is presumed to follow. Special assistance from a judge or expert,
therefore, would be superfluous and invade the exclusive province of the jury." (footnotes
omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Baerga v.Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL
2225129l:J., at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (finding that the plaintiff's testimony was .self
serving and uncorroborated).
178. See, e.g., Crume! v. Hampton Univ., No. Civ.A. 4:05CV31, 2005 WL 3357315, at
*7 (B.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to show that he was
substantially limited in the major life activity of breathing where his medical records,
submitted in support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, conflicted with his
own "self-serving" affidavit regarding the extent of his allergy symptoms as he had "not
provided sufficient evidence to refute the medical evidence").
179. See, e.g., Lakota v. Sonoco Prods. Co., No. Civ. A.00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL
596211, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2002) (noting that the plaintiff's treating physician never
regarded the plaintiff's deep vein thrombosis to be severe enough to recommend a medical
leave of absence).

--------~-----·-------~---·
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mention of such limitation in a psychiatric evaluation included in the
record. 180 Therefore, in the court's view, notwithstanding his own
testimony on the issue, the plaintiff failed to establish that he had a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of sleeping. 181
Casting doubt on the credibility of those claiming "disability" is
not limited to the case law of the ADA, and the notion of disability as
essentially and exclusively a medical phenomenon is tied to such
182
skepticism. As the political scientist Deborah Stone explains:
People could either be truly injured or feign injury. In the modern
understanding of disability, deception has become part and parcel ofthe
concept itself, and the nature of this deception is tied to the particular
form of validation used to detect it. The definition ofdisability and the

means to detennine it became cdtically linked 183

·

We require a doctor's note for absence from work or school and
medical documentation in numerous other contexts. Indeed, the
requirement of providing such documentation is done so frequently as
to not be questioned.
Thus, the ADA's enactment in 1990 simply created another forum
for this fear of deception to emerge. Such skepticism has been and
remains directed at the entire class of people who self-identify as
disabled. The prior case law developed under federal disability
benefits programs, with its explicit requirement ofmedical evidence to
Society has
corroborate claims, compounded the prob1em. 184
embraced medicine as the only reliable means to weed out the.
nefarious it).dividuals who seemingly exploit the opportunity to gain
some advantage by claiming disability. These three interrelated factors
have converged to create a judicial culture, successfully exploited by
defendants' attorneys, ·under which ADA claims of disability are
subjected to unwarranted evidentiary requirements.

I

·'

180. 2003 WL 22251294, at *5.
181. Id at *6; accord Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 2006)
(noting that while the plaintiff alleged that his depression led to, among other things, "severe
pressure on his brain" and an inability to eat, the medical evidence "reveals" that he had never
reported those particular symptoms to his physician).
182. See STONE, supnz note 42, at 28.
183. Id (emphasis added).
184. See in!Ta notes 206-230 and accompanying text.
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Malingering and the ADA

Much of the anti-ADA sentiment expressed in the popular
185
As
discourse reflects a suspicion of those who "claim disability."
· Professor Calker noted· in 1999, the popular media reflected a false
186
perception that the ADA was a "windfall statute for plainti:ffs." One
magazine columnist referred to the ADA as creating "'a lifelong buffet
of perks, special breaks and procedural protections' for people with
187
Journalist Mary Johnson documented
questionable disabilities."
numerous examples of virulent negative (and quite frequently false)
portrayals of the ADA in mainstream media and notes that much of it
188
Indeed, there was
was directed against the perceived "fakers."
specific discussion in Congress of ways to structure the
implementation of the ADA so as to "eliminate any potential for
189
abuse" by those asserting rights under the statute.
The public criticisms of the ADA reveal a recurring theme of
skepticism and distrust directed by the public against those ·asserting
their rights under the statute. One judge acknowledged public remarks
made in 1995 by the President of Boston University, Jon Westling, in a
lawsuit brought by Boston University students with learning
disabilities:

a

"[T]he . . . disability movement is a great mortuary for the ethics of
hard work, individual responsibility, and pursuit of excellence, and also
genuinely for human social order...."
... [B]y "seiz[ing] on the existence of some real disabilities and
conjur[ing] up other alleged disabilities in order to promote a particular
vision of human society," the learning disabilities movement cripples
allegedly disabled · students who could overcome their academic
difficulties ''with concentrated effort," demoralizes non-disabled
students who recognize hoaxes performed by their peers, and "wreak[s]
educational havoc" .... The policies that have grown out of learning
190
disabilities ideology leach our sense ofhumanity."

185. See, e.g., John Elvin, ADAs Good Intentions Have Unintended Consequences,
INSIGHT ON NEWS, Feb. 21,2000, at 18, 18-19.
186. Colker, Windfall, supra note 73, at 99.
187. Jd (quoting Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25
1997, at 16 [sic], 18).
188. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 22-75 (2003).
189. See Crossley, supra note 21, at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Guckenbergerv. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 118 (D. Mass. 1997).
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The media coverage of the ADA provides numerous examples of
cynical attitudes about the scope of the statute and the honesty ofthose
seeking its protections. For example, the washington Times< James
Brovard offered this exaggerated view of the statute's impact in a 1996
editorial:
(The ADA] has turned disabilities into prized legal assets, something to
be cultivated and flourished [sic] in court rooms to receive financial
windfalls. The ADA creates a powerful incentive to maximize the
number of Americans who claim to be disabled, since the claim of
191
disability amounts to instant empowerment in the eyes ofthe law.

This view is by no means unique or isolated. 192
Notions of "claiming disability" by malingering or faking
disability have long-standing roots in American culture. Scholars have
documented the development of negative attitudes, stereotypes, and
assumptions about disabled people from the post-Civil War era
through to the present and have noted a striking consistency in such
attitudes. 193 Professor Peter Blanck concluded from his historical
191. James Bovard, Editorial; Disability Intentions Aslnly, WASH. TIMES, May 20,
1996, at Al6, quoted in Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
109,210 (2001).
192. Other examples of this reaction compiled by Professor Blanck, supra note 191, at
205 n.323, include: Trevor Armbrister, A Good Law Gone Bad, READER'S DIG., May 1998,
at 145, 149 (claiming that a flood of frivolous ADA lawsuits has clogged the courts);
Editorial, The Horrors of the ADA, N.Y. PoST, May 1, 1999, at 16 (quoting Senator
Armstrong's view of the ADA as "'a legislative Rorschach test, whose meaning and
significance will be determined by years of costly litigation"'); Editorial, Laws Protecting
Disabled Too Susceptible to Abuse, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 9, 1999, at 1OA ("History may
record the Americans with Disabilities Act as one of the most costly and abused pieces of
legislation Congress ever brought forth."); Dan K. Thomasson, Op-Ed, Bureaucracy:
Creating Disabilities "Where None Existed, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 1999, at 19A
("[T]he [ADA] at times seems more like a prescription for absurdity than an effort to redress
injustices for those less fortunate.").
Professor Blanck, supra note 191, at 203 n.309, 217 n.379, 217 n.378, 210 n.349, also
cites WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY 134 (1997) ("Few laws have done as much as the
Americans with Disabilities Act to make a note from your doctor something you can take to
the bank."); Shalit, supra note 187, at 16; Michelle Stevens, High Court Must Define
Disability, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 2, 1999, at 35A (stating that "[a]ll manner of malingerers
have jumped onto the ADA bandwagon," and that the ADA protects "shameless shirkers");
Editorial, Cleaning Up the Mess, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 12, 1999, at 6B (arguing that the
ADA has generated more litigation than predicted, mostly by persons with questionable
disabilities). Parenthetical explanations for the previous citations were also provided by.
Professor Blanck, supra note 191.
193. See Blanck, supra note 191, at 210 (observing that criticism of the ADA as
"foster[ing] frivolous litigation" is "[r]eminiscent of President Cleveland's 1887 veto message
warning of the 'race after [Civil War] pensions' as placing 'a premium on dishonesty and
mendacity"'); see also Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil
Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics ofDisab1?ity in Amenca, 52 ALA. L. REv. 1, 2
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research of depictions of people with disabilities: "One hundred years
ago, and today ... disabled people are portrayed by some as shirkers,
His findings illustrate. that
malingerers, and free-loaders." 194
"historically, as in contemporary society, negative and stereotypical
views, either purposefully or unknowingly, contribute to conceptions
of disabled persons as 'illegitimate,' 'malingering,' and 'unworthy' ...
despite evidence to the contrary." 195
Thus,. it appears that the "malingerer problem" 196-that is, the
prospect of the existence of some individuals who may falsely claim to
be disabled for secondary gain-has long colored the entire category
of "the disabled" as a group of individuals with automatically suspect
credibility. 197 Accordingly, it is not surprising that society would
(2000) (stating that courts' resistance to the concepts of civil rights and antidiscrimination
central to the ADA may be due to the history of American disability policy); Peter Blanck &
Chen Song, "Never Forget Ulhat They Did Here':· Civil War Pensions for Gettysburg Union
Anny V§terans and Disability in Nineteenth-Century America, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1109, 1139 (2003) [hereinafter Blanck & Song 'Wever Forget Ulhat They Did Here'] (stating
that Gettysburg veterans with certain disabilities were considered to be Jess deserving of
pensions); Peter Blanck & Chen Song, Civil War; fension Attomeys and Disability Politics,
35 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 137, 138 (2002) (discussing the change in the view of disabled
people in American society following the Civil War); Peter Blanck & Chen Song, "YWth
Malice Toward None; YWth Charity TowardAll':· Civil War Pensions for Native and Foreign
Bam Union Anny V§temns, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2001) (stating that
the Civil War forever changed medical and public conceptions of disabled people in
America); Larry M. Logue & Peter Blanck, "There Is Nothing that Promotes Longevity Like
a Pension':· Disability Policy and Mortality of Civil War Union Anny V§terans, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 49, 67 (2004) (discussing how lessons learned from the past help modern
American society deal with misconceptions about disability).
Paula Berg has observed that the suspicion of those asserting a disability also derives
from the "deeply held American value of personal sovereignty, and the concomitant belief
that any type of personal misfortune, even the most crippling congenital impairment, can and
must be overcome by individual will." Berg, supra note 46, at 32-33.
194. Blanck, supra note 191, at 217.
195. Blanck & Song, 'WeverForget Ulhat They Did Here," supra note 193, at 1167.
196. See Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impainnents Under the Amencans with
Disabilities Act· A Search forihe Meaning of"Disability'; 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 600 n.82
(1998) ("[T]he ADA creates a unique set of incentives for rational individuals to malinger,
which makes the malingerer problem important for the ADA to address.").
197. See Blanck & Song, 'Wever Forget Ulhat They Did Here'; supra note 193, at
1167. We see here some overlap with the suspicious regard of the "narcissistic" disabled
plaintiff, as described by Lennard J. Davis. Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over Backwards:
Disability; Narcissism, and the Law, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING
DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 98, 102. Drawing on a number of contemporary and
historical sources, he notes that many regard the attitude of people with disabilities as
follows: "[D]isabled people claim that Nature has done them a wrong, and for this wrong
they seek reparation. This reparation is really an attempt to claim themselves as an exception
to the rules of society, which allows them to overstep the bounds assigned to normal people."
Id at 101. Davis observes from his analysis ofreasonable accommodation cases that such
view "carr[ies] over into the judicial realm." Id at 102.
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embrace a tool that holds promise· to :minimize such occurrence,
perhaps saving everyone much time and expense. Society identified
medicine as that tool and assigned a central role to physicians in
pronouncing who is (or is not) truly disabled, thet:eby presumably
weeding out any potential malingers in the disability determination
process. The cases requiring expert medical evidence in some or all
claims of disability both reflect and are a direct result of this notion
and suspicion.
An explicit demonstration of such attitude is· found in a district
court case, Farley v. Gibson Container, Jnc., 198 that is frequently cited as
199
authority by other courts. There, the United States District Court for
the Northern District ofMississippi granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on a claim brought by an employee who asserted
that he was disabled based upon complications from hernia surgery,
including pain, dizziness, bleeding, and nausea. 200 While the court
acknowledged that there was no dispute that the surgery occurred
(indeed, the surgery was required for a work-related injury and the
. employee was out of work for six weeks following the surgery), and
the plaintiff had offered evidence of limitations resulting from the
surgery, the court concluded: "[The plaintiff] has presented absolutely
no medical reports or other objective evidence substantiating his claim
that his injury and subsequent surgery left him with a condition which
rises to the level of a physical impairment. This court, as have others,
finds this omission significant."201
Thus, the court concluded, the plaintiff failed to establish that he
was a person with a disability. 202 The court's rationale for requiring
such objective evidence was as follows:
To hold otherwise would render the requirement of a physical
impairment superfluous and meaningless and would allow anyone with
any kind of condition, regardless of the severity, to claim a physical
. impairment. Employers should not be expected to recognize a physical
. impairment solely on an employee's "say-so," as Farley expects Gibson

198. 891 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
199. See, e.g., Kalekiristos v. CTS Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp 641, 657 (D.D.C.
1997) (quoting Farley in concluding that the plaintiffhad presented no evidence of substantial
limitation).
200. Farley, 891 F. Supp. at 324, 326.
201. Jd at 326. The plaintiff alleged that in the months following the surgery, his
surgical scar repeatedly opened when he engaged in heavy lifting at work, resulting in the
described pain, bleeding, nausea, and dizziness, causing him to leave work early each time
this occurred. Jd at 324.
202. Jd at 326-27.
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to do. The logical consequences of such blind acceptance are simply
203
too obvious to state.

Of course, tllis rejection of "blind acceptance" of the "say-so" of
those who "claim a physical impairment" is directly contrary to the
requirement established by the Supreme Court under the Celotex
trilogy. 204 Courts must apply all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion and accept the
nonmovants' version of facts as true, provided that it is supported by
any admissible evidence, with no weighing of evidence or
determinations of credibility by the court. 205 However, time and again,
courts deciding summary judgment motions on ADA claims fail to
heed tllls requirement.

B.

Roots ofthe Problem in the Development ofFederal Benefits
Programs

The question of "disability" that federal judges encounter most
often, and have for decades, is in the context of appeals of disability
determinations in the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.206 The political
scientist Deborah A. Stone traces the historical roots of the central
placement of medical expertise in disability determinations for public
entitlement programs in her book, The Disabled State. 207 Although her
focus is on disability determinations for government-based benefits
programs, such as SSDI and SSI, and she wrote before the enactment
203. Id at 326. Although the court couches the requirement for documentation as
something that the employer was entitled to, the rationale was in fact addressing whether the
court must "recognize a physical impairment solely on an employee's 'say-so,"' as there was
no issue in the case regarding a failure to provide medical documentation to the employer
defendant. Id Thus, it appears that the reference to the "employer" was perhaps intended to
suggest that a defendant should not be expected to concede the issue of disability in litigation
absent medical evidence of such disability.
204. See supm notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
205. Se~ e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58 (1970); lOA
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2727, at 459, 462 (19~8)
("Because the burden is on the movant, the evidence presented to the court always is
construed in favor of the party opposing the motion and the opponent is given the benefit of
all favorable inferences that can be drawn from it. . . . [F]acts asserted by the party opposing
the motion, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, are regarded as true."
(emphasis added)).
206. According to recent Social Security Administration statistics, approximately
13,000 appeals were filed in federal court from October 2005 to September 2006. Social
Security Online, Hearings and Appeals: Federal Court Review Process, http://www.ssa.gov/
appeals/court_process.htrnl (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
207. See generally STONE, supra note 42, at 90-117 (discussing how disability benefits
programs came to rely on medical evidence).
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of the ADA, her conclusions help answer the question of why courts,
especially federal courts, place central importance on corroborating
medical evidence for meeting the definition of disability under the
ADA.
Stone notes that the association between "disability" and
"deception" has its origins at least as far back as the English Poor
Laws and the control of "beggars" in local communities. 208 Thus, she
concludes, "[T]he very category of disability was developed ·to
incorporate a mechanism for distinguishing the genuine from the
artificial."209 But it was also the result of a political debate regarding
who was an appropriate recipient of public aid and accordingly
excused from the workplace economy. 210
208. Id at 32.
209. Id People with disabilities are by no means the only category of people who
have been subjected to skepticism and scrutiny ip. connection with participation in
"entitlement" programs, broadly defined. So-called "welfare queens," immigrants, and other
social groups identified with entitlement programs have and continue to be the objects of
public disdain, distrust, and urban myths regarding those allegedly "working the system." See
generally ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM? WELFARE POLICY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 7-17 (1998) (describing prevalent myths and negative opinions
associated with "welfare" in various forms); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S
MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 82-83 (1990)
(discussing standard beliefs about welfare in American society). Indeed, it is this historical
association with such groups that has led to deep-seated suspicion of those claiming disability
that persists to this day and threatens to restrict the expansion of their civil rights.
Recent studies by evolutionary psychologists suggest that in the course of our evolution
as social beings benefiting from communal norms of"reciprocal altruism," humans may have
developed specific "cheater-detection" abilities and strong dispositions to punish what are
perceived as violations of such norms among members of a community. See, e.g., Dan
Sperber & Vittorio Girotto, Does The Selection Task Detect Cheater-Detection?, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (J. Fitners & K. Sterelny eds., forthcoming),
available athttp://www.dan.sperber.com/cheatet'lo20detection.pdf; see also Leda Cosmides &
John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 180-206 (Jerome Barkow et
a!. eds., 1992) (arguing that people's minds have reasoning procedures that detect cheaters in
a social context).
210. See Matthew Diller, Entidement and Exclusion: The Role ofDisability in the
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 363 (1996) [hereinafter Diller, Entidement
and Exclusion]. Professor Diller notes that:
Public benefit, programs use the concept of disability to create an economic and
moral boundary that separates those who are required to work from those whose
participation in the labor force is excused. Despite its appearance of medical
objectivity, disability is a socially constructed status that can be defined in any
number of ways. Definitions of disability both reflect and reinforce a series of
normative values about the nature and extent ofthe social obligation to work.
Id; accord Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REv.
1003, 1069 (1998) [hereinafter Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies] (noting that suspicion of
"malingering" has been a source of public animosity towards disability benefits programs);
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The 1948 Advisory Council charged with determining a design
of the SSDI program recommended to the Senate that '"compensable
disabilities be restricted to those which can be objectively detennined
by medical examination or tests. . . . The danger of malingering which
might be involved in connection with such claims would thereby be
avoided."'211 Physicians initially resisted being placed in the role of
determining disability, although there were various distinct bases for
this resistance. 212 The "overwhelming majority" of physicians offering
testimony before Congress on the proposed program asserted that
"physicians could not possibly provide the kind of objective
determination desired by program advocates."213 These physicians
made three "technical" objections to the role proposed for physicians
in the new program: (1) that disability determination is an "inherently
subjective" process, and "honest physicians could legitimately disagree
about whether a person is disabled"; (2) that labeling a person as
"disabled" could be "therapeutically harmful," by impeding the
recovery and rehabilitation process, and possibly encouraging
malingering; and (3) the process of certifying disability would place
physicians in an "uncomfortable, if not conflictual, role."214
Nonetheless, notions of "medical objectivity" were incorporated in
subsequent amendments to the Social ·Security Act; indeed, it was
"faith in the techniques of medical examination and the powers · of
clinical judgment" that encouraged many legislators to support
expansions ofthe disability insurance programs.215
Stone argues that courts applying the Social Security Act
reinforced the "myth of objective clinical determination," and she cites
Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of Disability in
Organizations, 25 WoRK & OCCUPATIONS 397, 402 (1998) (noting the historical trend for the
state to use physicians to certify the legitimacy' of disabilities "[t]o separate those who have
authentic impairments from those who might take undeserved advantage of public aid for the
purpose of avoiding work").
211. STONE, supm note 42, at 79 (quoting S. REP. No. 80-162, at 6 (1948)) (emphasis
added by Stone).
212. Id at 80.
213. Id
214. Id at 80-81. Other objections raised by physicians pertained to feared effects on
the medical profession and the delivery of health care. Id at 80, 88.
215. Id at 83, 86. Economist Edward Yelin has examined the SSDI program and its
impact (or lack thereof) on withdrawal from the workforce. He·concludes that the occurrence
of true malingering is significantly exaggerated, and that the c;ry of widespread false claims is
a "'myth,"' which has been '"used [by politicians] to legitimate cutbacks in disability
benefits."' Blanck & Song, "Never Forget Mat They Did Here'; supm note 193, at 1167
(quoting Edward Yelin, The Myth ofMalingen'ng: My Jnmviduals Withdraw JTom Y!0rk in
the Presence oflllness, 64 MILBANK Q. 622, 647 (1986)).
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the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. Eldridge by way of
example: "The medical assessment of the worker's condition [in an
SSDI determination] implicates a more sharply focused and easily
documented decision than the typical determination of welfare
entitlem.ent. The decision whether to discontinue disability benefits
will normally turn upon routine, standard, and unbiased medical
reports by physician specialists."216 Stone also notes that focus upon
"impairment" is not the only mechanism used to determine
disability. 217
For example, in some epidemiological studies of
disability, the classification is based entirely upon the individuals'
statements of limitations in activities. 218 Thus, "a medical conception
of disability is not the only possible conception."219 It is, however, the·
approach generally followed when a person rriay claim disability for
some secondary benefit, where the specter of the "malingerer
problem" looms. 220
The requirement of medical corroboration 'in ADA cases may
also stem from some courts' view that the ADA is not a civil rights
statute aimed at eliminating discrimination and barriers but nothing
more than another form ofa "special rights" or "entitlements" program
for people with disabilities, similar to SSDI and SSI. The regulations
and case law (over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction) for
these two disability benefits programs make it clear that the presence
of a "medically detenninable physical or mental impairment"221 is the
predominant factor in assessing "disability,"222 that medical evidence is

216. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1976) (internal quotations marks
oniitted).
217. STONE, sup.ro note 42, at 108-109. ·
218. Seeidat109.
219. Id Indeed,. as James I. Charlton notes in his cross-cultural examination of
disability, NonnNG ABoUT Us WITHOUT Us (1998), many non-Western cultures have strictly
religious or spiritual conceptions of disability and that a clergyperson, not a healer, is given a
central role in "determinations" of disability. Id at 62-65.
220. Cf. Rudolph L. Rose, Insurance F.roud and Worke.m' Compensation, in
INSURANCE LAW 2005: UNDERSTANDING THE ABC's 473, 484 (John C. Yang ed., 2005)
("[T]rue malingerers carefully manage to avoid medical contacts which might unmask
them.").
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). See generally Frank S.
Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security's Medically Centered Definition of
Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 189, 192 (2007) (examining the difficulty in implementing
the ADA's definition of disability and the role that medical expertise plays in the "disability
determination process").
222. See Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion, sup.ro note 210, at 390-92.
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required in order to est.ablish eligibility, and that the presence of
disability is the central question. 223
The ADA, however, is plainly not an entitlement program. Its
scope and objectives are markedly different from those of the disability
benefits programs and reflect an important advancement in notions of
the respective roles ofpeople with disabilities and the society in which
they live and work 224 When federal courts fail (consciously or
unconsciously) to note the distinctions between notions of disability in
the ADA as opposed to those developed under entitlement programs,
this leads to continued reliance on the same notions of disability
reflected in the SSDI and SSI programs.225

223. See, e.g., 20 C.P.R. § 416.908 (2007) (requiring SSI applicants to demonstrate
that claimed "physical or mental impairment(s) ... results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques" and requiring that such impairment "be established by
medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [an
individual's] statement ofsymptoms" (emphasis added)).
Professor Crossley has observed that the SSDI program "illustrates the medical model
of disability in action," because:
[S]ociety allocates to physicians the authority to validate the existence of disability
and thus to provide an individual with access to whatever social assistance may be
available to disabled persons. It is up to a physician to diagnose or categorize the
cause of an impairment and to measure and document its functional impact. The
individual's own subjective experience of impairment or limitation is irrelevant
unless it can be professionally validated.
·
Crossley, sup.mnote 21, at 650-51.
224. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 210, at 1019-32; see also
Patricia Illingworth &Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled· The Relationship Between the
Definition of Disability and Rights Under the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 11 (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) ("[T]he ADA draws upon the traditions ofboth
civil rights laws as well as disability entitlement programs to create a complex, 'second
generation' statute that aims to achieve the negative liberty of self-sufficiency while fostering
the positive right to accommodation."); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 643 (2001) (stating that commentators contrast Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the ADA, arguing that the former is a true
antidiscrimination law while the latter is·a mere accommodation law); Michael Asl:iley Stein,
Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Acc,ommodations As Antidiscrimination, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 579, 583 (2004) (''ADA-mandated accommodations are an essential normative
device for effectuating equalitY on behalf of people with disabilities.").
225. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, 1J1e Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921, 927 (2003) (arguing that the "basic premise"
underlying the enactment of the ADA was that it would "reduce the cost of dependency of
people with disabilities" and that such a "welfare reform" approach is a fundamentally
inadequate "guide to disability employment policy"). Thus, to the degree that the ADA is
linked with public benefits programs, even as a means to "resolve" the problem of
dependency, it is not surprising that such connection blurs the distinction between notions of
disability in the otherwise distinct benefits and civil rights contexts.
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During the first ten years after the ADA's enactment, federal
courts struggled with how to handle cases brought by individuals who
had applied for SSDI or SSI benefits (i.e., claiming that their disability
rendered them unable to engage in any "substantial gainful activity")
but also brought actions under the ADA claiming to be qualified
226
Several courts applied the doctrine of
individuals with a disability.
judicial estoppel to such claims and entered summary judgment for the
defendants. 227 Scholars criticized this approach and noted the myriad
significant distinctions between notions of "disability" under each
statute.228 The issue was eventually addressed in 1999 by the Supreme
Court in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., which
rejected the per se application of judicial estoppel to such claims,
holding that benefits applicants who brought claims under the ADA
229
are entitled to explain the apparent self-contradictory assertions.
However, the conflation of notions of disability under benefits
programs (where such claims must always be validated by medical
evidence) and civil rights statutes .remains and limits the ADA's use as
a tool for advancing civil rights for people with disabilities. 230

C

Courts' Misplaced Reliance on Physicians

Judges (and policymakers) appear to take physicians' opinions of
disability as descriptions of definitive and irrefutable fact. The ADA's
226. See Diller, Dissonan,tDisabilityPolicies, supra note 210, at 1014, 1033.
227. Jd; see, e.g., Feldman v. Am. Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 789, 792 (7th
Cir. 1999); Taylorv. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1422-23 (11th Cir. 1998); Lorde v. City
of Philadelphia, No. CN.A.98-5267, 2000 WL 1763673, at *1, *4 (B.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2000);
Dayoub v. Penn-Dell Directory Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 636,638,643 (B.D. Pa. 2000).
228. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 210, at 1055-59. Professor
Diller also noted that:
The ADA is premised on the recognition that barriers to full participation in society
are socially created, rather than the inevitable consequence of medical
impairments....
The disability benefit programs are grounded on the premise that inability to
work is a consequence of medical impairments, rather than barriers created by
social institutions.
Id at 1005-06.
. 229. 526 u.s. 795, 807 (1999).
230. One can see the same skepticism in federal courts when applying other disability
related statutes. For example, several courts have held that in order to demonstrate a "serious
health condition" to trigger the application of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) a
plaintiff must present medical evidence. See, e.g., Dowell v. Ind. Heart Physicians, Inc., No.
1:03-CV-01410-DFH-TA, 2004 WL 3059788, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 2004) (holding that
an FMLA plaintiff "must offer evidence from a treating health care provider that her
pregnancy and related depression qualified as a serious health condition").
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developing case law reflects, in one scholar's words, "the modernist
faith in medical science and the dominance of the medical profession
within society."231 But while physicians unquestionably have much
expertise, this does not necessarily extend either to detecting
malingerers or to understanding the impact of a specific in1pairment
on a specific individual in a specific setting, whether work or
otherwise. As noted above, doctors at nne time resisted being foisted
into the role of determining disability,232 rather than simply medical
impairment.233 The reasons for such resistance provide a· further basis
to question the role they have been assigned.
The medical profession as a whole does not claim to be
234
especially skilled at detecting malingering.
Indeed, the current
medical literature suggests precisely the opposite: physicians cannot
235
detect malingering to a reliable degree. Two researchers conducted a
recent meta-analysis of the literature on malingering in the medical
legal context and concluded that physicians have no place making
determinations of malingering in legal cases.236 They ·note that
231. Berg, supm note 46, at 20.
232. See STONE, supm note 42, at 80-83 (recounting the testimony offered by
physicians in opposition to the impairment-based approach to disability proposed for the
enactment of SSDI program and specifically denying iliat physicians were capable of making
objective medical determinations of disability). Stone also states that "[t]he [medical]
profession steadfastly maintains that 'inability to work' itself is not quantifiable, at least by
doctors." Id at 113.
233. See George E. Ehrlich & Fredrick Wolfe, On the Difficulties ofDisability and its
Detennination, 22 RHEUMATIC DISEASE CLINICS N. AM. 613, 616 (1996) ("The physician's
important task is to aid his patient in, becoming what the patient wishes; but in the disability
adjudication process the physician's best role is to stay away from determining disability, that
interaction between function and society, and only to determine functional ability."); Erin
O'Fallon & Steven Hillson, Physician Discomfort and Variability in Disability Assessments,
20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MEn. 852, 853 (2005) (reporting results of study that lists completing a
"disability assessment" to be the task that gives physicians most discomfort, ahead of
assessing domestic abuse and having end-of-life discussions with patients, and also noting
great variability in the results of such disability assessments among physicians).
234. See Mark Thimineur et a!., Malingering and Symptom Magnification: A Case
Report Illustrating the Limitations of Clinical Judgment, 64 CoNN. MEn. 399, 400 (2000)
("There are currently no reliable methods to identify the malingering chronic pain patient and
no peer reviewed literature on symptom magnification.").
235. See, e.g., id at 399-401 (describing a case in which several physicians assumed a
patient with a workers' compensation claim to be malingering, when a lesion was later found
to be the source of her complaints); Kenneth D. Craig & Melanie A. Badali, Introduction to
the Special Senes on Pain Deception and Malingering, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 377, 378-80
(2004); David A. Fishbain et a!., Is There a Relationship Between Nonorganic Physical
Findings (Waddell Signs) and Secondazy Gain/Malingering?, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 399 (2004);
Mark Sullivan, Exaggemted Pain Behavior: By What Standard? 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 433
(2004).
236. See George Mendelson & Danuta Mendelson, Malingering Pain in the
Medicolegal Context, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 423 (2004).
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physicians are often forced into this role: "Regrettably, in many ...
cases, judges virtually invite the expert witness to usurp the fact
finding role of the court and to offer evidence about issues that
properly belong to the· court, including whether or not the plaintiff is
237
truthful or lying." Even where such invitation is not "express," this is
nonetheless the effect when courts require plaintiffs to offer expert
medical evidence as part of their claim. Lawyers too "may attempt to
seduce the expert witness to express an opinion that is beyond the
legitimate limits of his or her professional expertise, either attesting to
the veracity of the lawyer's client or labeling the opponent's client as a
malingerer."238
A pair of physicians writing on this subject observed: "[T]he.
features associated with disability are not those for which the physician
is either the primary source of information or the best judge."239 They
note that a physician's assessment of a patient may be distorted in the
legal contexe4° For example, if a physician notes on a chart that a
patient is '"better,' it may mean that he is coping better, marshaling
resources better, or is happier, but not necessarily that he is functioning
any better."241 However, such statement would be no doubt damaging
to the patient's ability to establish disability.
Similarly, some
physicians may feel that attaching a label of "disabled" to a patient is
disadvantageous to their patients; many physicians hold the "general
professional belief in the value of communicating a sense of hope to
the patient; a determination of disability is thought to deprive the
patient ofbelief in recovery and therefore of a will to recover."242
The parameters set by courts regarding the role of medical
evidence often reflect a lack of understanding of how physicians
approach assessment ·of patients. For example, some courts that
require medical evidence to prove disability in ADA claims further
insist that any medical evidence be limited to a physician's
"independent" assessment of the nature of the impairment and the
extent of any limitations, unpolluted by the statements and claims of
· the plaintiff-patient. Thus, in some instances, the medical evidence
offered in support of a claim of disability is disregarded where it is not
237. Id at428.
238. Id at 431.
239. Ehrlich & Wolfe, sup.ronote 233, at 619.
240. Seeid at 620.
241. Id The authors, in fact, go so far as to suggest that doctors should withhold
progress notes when they are sought in legal cases, "since in sharing them we may violate our
responsibility to our patients." Id
242. STONE, sup.ronote 42, at 151.
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sufficiently "objective." For example, in Baerga v. Hospital for Special
Surgery, the court commented that the evidence ·in a psychological
report was less than persuasive because it merely "relies on Plaintiff's
self-reporting and conclusory allegations."243 In Kn'skovic v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a promotion due to
a disabling foot injury, which restricted his physical activities,
including his ability to walk. 244 The court entered summary judgment
for the defendant on the plaintiff's claims, holding that he had failed to
produce evidence that he was substantially limited in the major life
activities of standing and wa1king. 245 The court dismissed the
deposition testimony of the plaintiff's physician as being probative on
that issue because it was couched in "imprecise, subjective terms," that
"no objective tests" were performed to determine the plaintiff's ability
to walk, and that :the doctor's estimates of the plaintiff's limitations
were based "only on his familiarity with [the plaintiff's] type of injury
and [the plaintiff's] comments to him."246 Thus, his opinions were ''too
uninformed and speculative to create a triable issue [of fact] ."247 These
cases overlook the fact that subjective complaints are a significant
basis of evaluation and diagnosis in medicine, especially in the areas of
chronic pain conditions such as fibromyalgia, and mental illness,
yielding no less valid diagnoses in the eyes of the medical
profession.248
Historically, medicine. was not always associated with objective
assessments.249 The concept of objective determinations of medical
conditions accompanied developments in medical technology, starting
with the invention of the stethoscope in 1819, and, most significantly,
with the X-ray machine. 250 Much of the motivation to develop such
243. No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL 22251294, at *5 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
244. 948 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (B.D. Wise. 1996).
245. Id at 1363-64.
·
246. Id at 1364.
247. Id
248. See STONE, supra note '42, at 109 ("In epidemiological studies of disability
conducted by governmental agencies, interviews are generally used (rather than medical
examination), and the classification of people as disabled is made on the basis of whether
they saythey have limitations on: their normal activities.").
249. Jd at 104-06; see also MILOS JENICEK, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
MEDICINE 5-7 (2003) ("In Ancient Greece and throughout history, physicians were often
outstanding philosophers first and only later became biologists."); J. ROSSER MATTHEWS,
QUANTIFICATION AND THE QUEST FOR MEDICAL CERTAINTY 4 (1995) (examining the debate in
nineteenth-century .Europe regarding the use of statistical analysis in medicine and noting the
criticisms of physicians of such use on the basis that medicine was an "art" rather than a
"science").
250. See STONE, supra note 42, at 104-06.
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technologies was to separate the patient from the diagnostic process,
and with it, the possibility for exaggeration or feigning of symptoms.251
The purported deficiencies in the expert opinions raised in the
decisions discussed immediately above, such as an absence of
laboratory findings or exclusive reliance upon a patient's report of
symptoms, are classic fodder for cross-examination of treating or
evaluating physicians at trial. Imposing a requirement of introducing
objective evidence, however, guarantees that a plaintiff who does not
(and in the case of certain conditions, cannot) produce this type of
evidence will never present her case to a jury. Courts can and should
leave the ultimate decision on the sufficiency and weight of medical
evidence, whatever its content or basis, to the fact finder. 252
Assigning physicians a central role in validating disability claims
is also based upon an assumption that physicians themselves have a
solid grasp on their patients' experiences. However, several studies
point to physicians' inability to ·accurately judge patients' subjective
complaints, especially pain. 253 Such studies conclude that physicians,
especially ones who have been practicing for several years, routinely
rate pain as being far milder than their patients' oWn. assessments of
their pain.254 One medical commentator has observed: "[T]here is
widespread underassessment and underestimation of pain, badly
deserving correction. This undoubtedly is fed by reservations about
the credibility of self-report expressed not only by scientists, but also
251. Seeid
252. In dictum in an unreported per curiam decision, the Seventh Circuit correctly
notes that the evaluation of subjective complaints of pain is a credibility issue and therefore
inappropriate for summary judgment. Beasley v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., No. 95-3477, 1996 WL
102546, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The court's brief but careful discussion of the issue
stands in stark contrast to its later decisions, and those of the district courts applying such
decisions, regarding the need for corroborating evidence of disability. See, e.g., McPhaul v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2000) (''All that [the plaintiff] can present in
support of her reasonable accommodation claim is her own self-serVing testimony, and in this
case, that is just not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she is a qualified individual
with a disability under the ADA."). Likely because it was unpublished, the Beasley decision
has never been cited by another court.
253. See John T. Chibnall et al., The Effects ofMedical Evkience and Pain Intensity
on Medical Student Judgments of Chrome Pain Patients, 20 J. BEHAV. MED. 257, 266-68
(1997).
254. See, e.g., id at 258 (explaining how studies show that as patient pain levels
increase, observers progressively discount the pain); John· T. Chibnall et al., h1temist
Judgments ofChronk Low Back Pain, 1 PAIN MEo. 231, 236 (2000); Laetitia Marquie et al.,
Pain Rating by Patients and Physicians: Evklence ofSystematic Pain Miscalibration, 102
PAIN 289, 289-94 (2003); Maida J. Sewitch et al., Measuring Differences Between Patients'
and Physicians' Health Perceptions: The Patient-Physician Discordance Scale, 26 J. BEHAV.
MED. 245, 260 (2003).
.
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by the public at large."255 As literature scholar Elaine Scarry stated
succinctly: "[T]o have great pain is to have certainty; to hear that
256
another person has pain is to have doubt."
For these reasons, an argument can be made that physicians are
frequently not competent, in the evidence rules' application of the
word, to offer testimony about an individual's disability. 257 Since the
- ADA and the Supreme Court require an individualized review of
disability, including the specific limitations experienced by the
individual, then the most (and in many cases, only) relevant evidence
should be a description of the plaintiff's daily life and the barriers
(literal and figurative) that she encounters.258 Since few physicians are
fully aware of the barriers encountered by and the daily experiences of
their patients (because such matters are often not seen as relevant to
the diagnosis and treatment of diseases and conditions); testimony by
physicians may offer little to aid the fact finder's understanding of the
plaintiff's disability. 259 In contrast, it.is plaintiffs who can provide the
mostreliable evidence of disability.
As seen above, societal preoccupation with malingering and the
role of physicians' opinions in determining disability developed
together from the earliest examples of legal remedies and public
benefits extended to people on the basis of medical conditions. They
are now nearly inextricably tied and account at least in part for the
courts' straying from the mandates of summary judgment procedure in
ADA claims.
. VI. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS AND QUESTIONS
Although both the stated and ·unstated rationales of courts'
insistence upon expert medical evidence to establish disability are
misplaced, there are some additiomil issues that warrant consideration.
Many of these questions broaden the discussion beyond the issue of
disability discrimination and the ADA's parameters to considerations
255. Craig & Badali, supmnote 235, at 379 (footnotes omitted).
256. ELAINE SCARRY, THEBODYINPAIN 7 (1985).
257. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 703.
258. See Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[A]
plaintiff's testimony may suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact."); Haynes v.
Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff's personal testimony
about his ability to sleep created a genuine issue offact).
259. Cf.Wolz v. Deaton-Kennerly Co., No. 98 C 6610,2001 \VL 699096, at *6 n.6
(N.D. Ill. June 20, 2001) (observing, in an ADA claim brought by a plaintiff with
fibromyalgia, that the plaintiff's physician stated at her deposition that she is as a general
matter '"very anti-disability for fibromyalgia patients."').
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of evidence law generally, including the role of expert medical
testimony in contemporary trials and the extent to which the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow an ADA plaintiff to establish the fact of her
disability solely through her own testimony. The resolution of these
questions further underscores courts' errors in concluding that expert
medical evidence is an indispensable requirement for establishing
disability under the ADA.

A.

The Evolving Role ofthe Medical Expert and the Prima Facie
Case
·

The ADA is not the only context in which some courts require a
party to introduce expert testimony to establish a prima facie case. In
certain other settings, courts require a party to offer expert testimony,
including expert medical evidence, to establish a particular fact "where
more than common knowledge and experience. are needed to
understand the issues and to form an opinion."260 Stated another way,
expert testimony is not required where "'the subject of inquiry is one
which is plainly comprehensible by the jury and of such a nature that
unskilled persons would. be capable of forming correct conclusions
respecting it without the opinion of experts."'261
This rule is a contemporary manifestation of the evolving notions
of the respective roles of the jury and the expert witness. 262 At one
time, the pretrial controversy was almost exclusively over whether to
permit the introduction of expert testimony. 263 Courts viewed such
"experts" with suspicion, as overeducated ·hired guns who would
confuse the jury or who would usurp the role of the jury or judge.264
· Thus, under the common law rule, such testimony was admissible only
where a necessity for such evidence had been demonstrated. 265 A
nineteenth-century opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
demonstrates this caution well. 266 In Pulsifer v. Berry, one of the issues
on appeal was whether the trial court had properly permitted the ·
testimony of a railroad engineer regarding the care that should have

260. Estate ofSewart v. Taff, 602 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
261. Baker v. Mid Me. Med. Ctr., 499 A.2d 464, 469 (Me. 1985) (quoting Ginn v.
Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874, 883 (Me. 1975)).
262. See KAYEET AL., supmnote 176, §§ 1.2-1.2.2, at 5-7.
263. Jd § 1.2.1, at 6-7 (noting that at common law, experts were limited to testifying
about issues that were sufficiently outside ofthe knowledge ofthe jury).
264. Jd § 1.2, at 5-6.
265. Jd § 1.2.1, at6-7.
266. Pulsifer v. Berry, 32 A. 986 (Me. 1895).
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267

been taken to prevent the spread of a_ fire. The court held that the
testimony should have been excluded and noted:
It is an elementary rule respecting the introduction of oral evidence that,
in general, witnesses are only permitted to state facts within their
lmowledge, and not to give their opinions or conclusions. The testimony
of experts constitutes one of the exceptions to this rule. . . . But the
opinions of experts are not deemed admissible where the subject of the
inquiry is one of general observation or experience, and not such as
require any peculiar habits or study in order to qualify a man to
understand it. . . . The jurors may have less skill and experience than
the witnesses, and yet have enough to draw their own conclusions, and
do justice between the parties. Where the facts can be placed before a
jury, and they are of such a nature that jurors generally are just as
competent to form opinions in reference to them, and draw inferences
from them, as witnesses, then there is no occasion to resort to expert or
opinion evidence. . . . . With respect to all matters which may be
presumed to be within the common experience of all men of common
education, moving in the ordinary walks of life, it is deemed safer to
take the judgment of unskilled jurors than the opinion of biased
experts. 268
Many of these notions regarding the limitation on expert opinion
evidence were eventually codified in courts' rules of evidence,
269
including those applied to the federal courts.
However, during the
second half of the twentieth century, courts moved away from notions
of necessity and towards analyses of whether such evidence would be
270
"helpful" to the jury.
VVhat is remarkable is that in some
jurisdictions, the standard for whether expert testimony was admissible
has been transformed, in some cases, into the standard for whether
271
such testimony is required Thus, as a general rule, "if a party seeks
to prove an issue that is beyond the ken of the jury, that party must
272
present expert testimony."
Although the language mirrors the
common law approach to the admissibility of expert testimony, this
requirement is not an evidentiary rule at all but, rather, a requisite of
the substantive law underlying a plaintiff's claim for relief Thus, the

267. Id at 987-88.
268. Id (citations and internal quotations marks omitted) (emphasis added).
269. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 602,703.
270. SeeKAYEETAL., supmnote 176, § 1.2.2, at7-9.
271. See, e.g., Bakerv. Mid. Me. Med. Ctr., 499A.2d464, 469 (Me. 1985) (addressing
the necessity of expert testimony, quoting Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874 (Me. 1975),
an appeal regarding the exclusion of expert testimony).
272. KAYEET AL., supmnote 176, § 1.6, at 38.
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absence of such testimony necessarily results in the failure to establish
each ofthe elements of such claim.
To a certain degree, the Katz-Marinelli line of cases reflects the
notion that there are certain · medical conditions-those that are
"obvious"-regarding which a jury need not receive medical
testimony to evaluate and consider. But for certain other claimed
impairments, these courts hold, a physician's opinion is an
indispensable prerequisite to establishing disability. Under this
approach, conditions calling for expert testimony include: a heart
274
fibromyalgia, 275 a learning
condition,273 deep vein thrombosis,
disorder, 276 anxiety disorders,277 and agoraphobia. 278 Although the
courts in the Second Circuit follow a sine qua non rule of medical
evidence, the district court in Sussle v. Sirina Protection Systems
C01p., which sets forth the most detailed analysis of the issue,.
specifically noted that the claimed disability at issue in that case,
Hepatitis C, would not be understood by the jury.279 By comparison,
those conditions found to be sufficiently "obvious" and therefore not
requiring expert testimony include: arm and neck pain,280 back and
282
abdominal pain,281 and hearing loss.
Thus, these ADA cases demonstrate how, in modem case law, the
relevant inquiry for allowing the admission of expert evidence has
morphed into a nearly identical inquiry for whether such testimony is
required as a matter of substantive law. However, as discussed above,
there .is no basis in the text or regulations of the ADA to conclude that
expert testimony is required to establish a prima facie claim of
disability. 283
This conclusion is reaffirmed by examining and contrasting
contexts other than the ADA definition of disability in which courts
273. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996).
274. Lakota v. Sonoco Prods. Co., No. Civ.A.00-30219-FHF, 2002 WL 596211, at *3
4 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2002).
275. Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-1963, 2005 WL
•
3434£41, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005).
276. Dorn v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 (W,D. Pa. 2002).
277. Ashton v. AT & T Corp., No. Civ.A.03~CV3158(DMC), 2005 WL 2320899, at *5
(D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2005).
278. ld
279. 269 E Supp. 2d 285,303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
280. Marinelli v. City ofErie, 216 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000).
281. Dicino v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, No. Civ.Ol-3206(JBS), 2003 WL 21501818, at
*7 (D.N.J. June 23, 2003).
282. Gourleyv. Home Depot, No. Civ.A.99-5728, 2001 WL 755102, at *3 & n.6 (E.D.
Pa. .June 29, 2001).
283. Seesupranotes 132-173 and accompanying text.
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require a plaintiff to offer expert m~dical evidence to support not
simply a given fact, but a prima facie case. One such context is
medical malpractice litigation, where a common law rule (codified by
some statesY84 evolved requiring the use of expert medical testimony to
establish a prima facie case. 285 There, the requirement is not based on
the use of a physician's testimony to disclose, explain, or validate the
plaintiff's own experience, but to provide competent evidence of one
of the elements of claim. 286 Only a physician (with the appropriate
training and experience) can testify to the standard of professional
medical care ·in a given contexe87 The same requirement applies
equally in other professional malpractice cases: expert testimony by a
member of the profession must be presented (or an expert on the
profession must testify) as to the profession's standards of care.288
Thus, in these contexts, the focus of the expert testimony is, to a great
extent, on the defendant's actions or inaction, rather than the plaintiff's
condition. Indeed, in some medical malpractice cases, where the
breach-of-duty issue to be determined in a case is one within the
common lmowledge of jurors, such as the failure to remove a foreign
object or instrument (e.g., "the overlooked sponge") used in surgery or
a failure to provide informed consent, no ·such testimony is required;
courts rule that a jury is competent to determine the standard of care
without the aid of a medical expert.289
Another example of the potential need for medical evidence in a
tort claim is where a plaintiff is alleging a complex causation fact, such
as the effect of exposure to certain toxins, the development of cancer,

a

284. See, e.g., Haase v. Starnes, 915 S.W2d 675, 678 (Ark. 1996) (interpreting
codification but noting that expert evidence is not always required).
285. Estate of Sewart v. Taff, 602 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that
expert medical testimony is needed "to establish the benchmark standard of care because
jurors are unskilled in the practice of medicine and would be unable without medical
evidence to determine any lack of necessary scientific skill").
286. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 176, § 1.6, at 38. Some courts have in fact clarified
that expert medical testimony is required only in medical malpractice cases in which the
standard of care is at issue; in other types of malpractice cases, such as breach of express
warranty, such testimony is not needed. Haase, 915 S.W.2d at 677-79.
287. See 32 C.J.S. Evidence§ 637, at 512 (1996).
288. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 176, § 1.6, at 38 ("Thus, except in cases of res ipsa
loquitur, expert testimony is required to prove that a professional failed to meet his
profession's standard of care.").
289. One author notes that courts began carving out exceptions to the requirement of
medical evidence because plaintiffs encountered such difficulty finding physicians who were
willing to testify for a medical malpractice plaintiff. David E. Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice Cases and the ReluctantExpert, 16 CATH. U. L. REv. 158, 159-60 (1966).
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or other illnesses. 290 In the absence of such evidence, jurors would be
asked to engage in pure speculation about the existence of a causal link
between an exposure and an illness. Thus, while there are at least
some contexts in which courts appropriately require expert medical
testimony before submitting a case to a jury, in no cont~xt is the
medical evidence required to provide corroboration of a plaintiff's
claims.
Moreover, if we broaden the question to the requirement of
medical evidence in personal injury cases generally, such as to prove
the harm to the plaintiff, courts have little basis to preclude a plaintiff
from going to trial without an expert. There are few reported cases in
which a plaintiff's failure to provide expert testimony on the issue of
injuries resulting froin a defendant's negligence was the sole basis to
preclude her from going to trial. 291 There can be little question that the
testimony of a well-qualified expert to explain the nature and extent of
a plaintiff's injury enhances a plaintiff's credibility and therefore the
likelihood of her recovery, but this is an issue distinct from whether
such testimony is necessary to established the elements of a plaintiff's
claim. Indeed, one of the central tactics of defending a personal injury
claim is to expose exaggerated levels of injury· through the use of
discovery tools or cross-examination. A plaintiff who proceeds to trial
without some medical evidence to support her claims of harm does so
at her own peril, but, of course, courts allow imperiled claims to go to
trial all the time.
Another context in which courts debate the requirement of
medical documentation of disability is banlauptcy adversary
proceedings in which a debtor seeks a discharge of an educational
loan, which are categorically excluded from dischargeable debts

290. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 176, § 1.6, at 38; see also Jones v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Although juries are normally permitted to
decide issues of causation without guidance from experts, the unlmown and mysterious
etiology of cancer is beyond the experience of laymen and can only be explained through
expert testimony." (internal quotations marks omitted)).
291. Historically, one exception has been in the case of emotional distress torts where
there needed to be an expert medical witness to testify as to the objective physical
manifestations of emotional distress. It is now well-settled, however, that a plaintiff need not
present expert testimony to establish such distress or harm. Such emotional distress may be
demonstrated solely through a plaintiff's own testimony, including in employment
discrimination claims, although a plaintiff is generally permitted to offer corroborating
testimony. See Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996); Bolden v. Se.
Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 34 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); Zerilli v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 973 F.
Supp. 311, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 97-7921, 97-9219, 1998 WL
642465 (2d Cir.Apr. 6, 1988).
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otherwise, on the basis of "undue hardship."292 Several courts have
recognized that a disability that limits one's ability to work may
constitute such hardship, but are not in agreement regarding the
evidentiary burden on debtor-plaintiffs in such cases.293 In many ways,
the arguments there are similar to and parallel with those in ADA
cases.294 The discussion, however, is focused more on the overall
burden of a plaintiff to prevail on such ~laims (in which the court sits
as fact finder) rather than to establish a prima facie case for purposes
of surviving summary judgmene95 The undue hardship exception
imposes a demanding burden on debtors seeking discharge. If one is
claiming hardship from a medical condition, she must establish that it
will prevent her from maintaining a standard of living "for a
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans."296
Courts require debtors to present "[s]ubstantial credible evidence ... to
support the existence of such a medical condition," more than ''bare
allegations."297 Even under this standard, however, few courts require
the presentation of expert medical testirnony.298 The general trend in
these cases is to permit a debtor to demonstrate that a medical
condition limits her ability to repay the loan through judicial notice,
documentation of eligibility for certain public benefits programs such
as SSDI, or the production of medical records, to corroborate the
debtor's own testimony. 299 And some courts simply conclude that the

292. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
293. See In reNash, 446 F.3d 188, 192-93 (1st Cir. 2006) (ruling that a mental illness
could be an undue hardship, but the plaintiff needs to provide reliable evidence of the long
term prognosis and effect of the illness); In re Shilling, 333 B.R. 716, 722-23 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2005) (holding that a judge's detemiination that a debtor temporarily "met the disability
requirements of the Social Security Act" was not sufficient evidence of a permanent or
prolonged hardship).
294. Compare Baerga v. Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL
22251294, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 30, 2003) (stating that one can be substantially limited in
tne area of working if his disability precludes him from doing more than one type of job),
with Nash, 446 F. 3d at 192-94 (stating that the plaintiff failed to show that she was entitled to
undue hardship discharge of her student loan debt because she did not show that her mental
illness would prevent her from working in the future).
295. See Nash, 446 F.3d at 194 (holding that a bankruptcy judge did not err in finding
that a plaintiff did not satisfY her burden of proof where she failed to provide evidence of a
future period ofunemployability due to her mental illness).
296. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987).
297. In re Mosley, 330 B.R. 832, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
298. See id at 842-43.
299. Jd at 843-45.

----~

----~~---~----

--·-----

-----~----

----- ----·-----------------

64

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

debtor's testimony is sufficiently detailed and credible to support a
300
discharge.
•
Thus, judges evaluating ADA claims appear to be alone in
requiring expert medical testimony to corroborate a plaintiff's
assertions of a medical condition to establish a prima facie case.
Courts have not articulated a reason why ADA claims should receive
such additional scrutiny. In both ADA and tort claims, a plaintiff must .
disclose and discuss the details ofthe impact of an impairment on her
daily life. 301 Certainly, there are important differences between offering
evidence to quantify and explicate the specific harm resulting from a
tortious act so that a fact finder may attach a numeric value to such
harm and establishing that one belongs to a class of individuals which
is disadvantaged by a combination of personal physical characteristics
and a physical environment structured by society in such a way as to
render one disabled. But such differences do not support imposing an
additional burden on ADA plaintiffs. Indeed, one could argue that the
opposite should be the case because an ADA plaintiff is not asking that
302
a monetary value be placed on her medical condition.
B.

EVJdentiazyLimitations on aLayperson 3' Testimony ofDisability

A companion question to whether expert medical testimony is
required in ADA, tort, or other cases is whether such evidence is
required, even as a purely practical matter, because testimony
regarding certain elements of a claim cani:zotbe offered by the plaintiff
herself. In other words, can a plaintiff describe to a jury her medical
condition and the resulting impairments without running afoul of
evidentiary ljmitations on such testimony? If the answer is "no," it
suggests that medical evidence would be needed to prove the existence
ofthe disability.
There are two closely related evidentiary rules that may be
implicated with testimony of one's. disability. First, a witness is limited
300. Id at 846-47.
301. Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr. Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 765 (lOth Cir. 2006)
("To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must . . . . (1) have a recognized
impainnent, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the
impairment substantially limits one or more ofthose activities.").
302. While the ultimate outcome of an ADA claim may well involve some cost to the
defendant and gain by the plaintiff, such costs and gains are not calculated as part of the
disability determination stage of the claim, but, rather, are based upon findings of whether
there was disparate treatment, denial of a reasonable accommodation, or some other violation
of the statute. See Douglas M. Staudmeister, Comment, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to
Assessing Nonpecuniary Damages in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U. L. REv.
189,203-05 (1996) .

..
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to testifying to facts within her personal lmowledge. . This
requirement restricts testimony to those facts that can be perceived and
were in fact directly perceived by the witness. 304 A second distinct rule
is that against the admission ofhearsay statements, or assertions of fact
told to the witness out-of-court.305 Thus, if a witness testifies to a fact
as told to her by another, this is hearsay, which is generally
inadmissible unless a particular exception applies. 306 If she testifies to
a fact for which no foundation for her lmowledge has been established
(and, indeed, the context indicates that she could be aware of such fact
only as a result ofbeing the recipient of a hearsay statement rather than
perceiving such fact for herself), such evidence should be excluded
because of a lack ofpersonallmowledge, not because her only basis of
lmowledge is likely to be hearsay, although practitioners and courts
frequently confuse the two rules. 307
However, it is not always apparent what facts are based solely
upon a witness's personallmowledge. Indeed, as some commentators
have observed: "The personal lmowledge requirement does not
demand lmowledge in an absolute or literal sense."308 Indeed, a witness
cannot testify as to what she has perceived without relating it,
consciously or unconsciously, to her own past experience and existing
foundation oflmowledge and understanding. 309 As the modem editors
of McConnick on Evidence observed: "When the witness ... bases
his testimony partly upon firsthand lmowledge and partly upon the
account of others, the problem calls for practical compromise."310
Specifically, such testimony should be admitted (or excluded) based
upon the court's determination of the overall reliability of the

303. FED.R.EVID. 602.
304. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 247, at424-25 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006)
(examining the difference between the hearsay rule and the rule requiring firsthand
knowledge).
305. Id § 248, at 425.
306. See, e.g., FED.R.EVID. 801(d).
307. See McCORMICK, supra note 304, § 247, at 424 ("The distinction is one of the
form of the testimony, whether the witness purports to give the facts directly upon his or her
own credit (though it may appear later that the statement was made on the faith of reports
from others) or whether the witness purports to give an account of what another has said and
this is offered to establish the truth ofthe other's report.").
308. 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE§ 6023, at 221 (2007).
309. Id § 6023, at 228 & n.22 (citing discussion of "knowledge structures" in
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIALJUDGMENT28-42 (1980)).
310. McCORMICK, supra note 304, § 10, at23.
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evidence. 311
The oft-cited example of such lmowledge is an.
individual's age or date of birth. 312 Since no person recalls the actual
events surrounding one's own birth, one is necessarily relying upon, to
some degree, reports from others regarding the date of that evene 13
The same is true regarding kinship (how can you know someone is
your brother, aunt, grandfather, etc. but from what others have told
. you?), and, a:s with a witness's age, courts generally permit testimony
of such facts.314
·
How do·ithese evidentiary principles apply when a witness offers
testimony regarding a medical condition? The general rule stated by
courts in reported opinions has been essentially unchanged for years.
A plaintiff may testify as to her "general condition" and describe
symptoms and their impact on her daily life, but she may not testify as
to her medical diagnoses and prognosis. 315
In practice, the line between what a plaintiff can testify to and
what is reserved for the province of medical expertise is unsettled.
Some courts may permit use of a diagnostic term by a plaintiff in her
testimony, but most will rule that anything "medical" beyond the
diagnosis itself is necessarily outside the expertise of the plaintiff or is

311. Id;,~~e also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 308, § 6026, at 254-57.
312. Se~/e.g., Antelope v. United States, 185 F.2d 174, 175 (lOth Cir. 1950) (holding
that the alleg~d.~ictirn of statutory rape could testify as to her age); McCORMICK, supra note
304, § 10, at43;WruGHT &GOLD, supra note 308, at§ 6026, at255.
313. seeAntelope,185F.2dat175.
314. This practice is reflected in Federal Ru1e of Evidence 804(b)(4), which created a
limited hearsay exception for statements regarding family history.
315. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) ("While it would have been proper for plaintiff to describe any symptoms or physical
limitations which she did not experience prior to the incident [at issue in the litigation], as
well as testify to how she felt, it was improper -for her to testifY concerning special medical
conditions such as high blood pressure and angina. Plaintiff was not qualified as an expert
and was therefore incompetent to testifY regarding specific medical diagnoses." (citations
omitted)); Morphew v. Morphew, 419 N.E.2d. 770, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("[A] lay
witness may testify about his or her illness. However, '[w]ith regard to diagnosis, causes and
effects of disease ... opinions of lay or nonexpert witnesses are not competent evidence."'),
superseded by statute on othergrounds, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 423(a), 98 Stat. 494, 799; 32 C.J.S. Evjdence § 551 (1996) ("While a nonexpert or lay
witness may not give expert testimony as to his physical condition, he may state simple
inferences drawn from his conscious subjective sensations concerning such condition....
According to some authority, a witness should be confined to testimony or statements
relating to the outward appearance of his injuries and to the symptoms experienced by him,
such as pain, suffering, and the like, and should not be permitted to testify as to the nature of
his injuries, the applicable medical terminology, and the like, and the medical prognosis or
treatment. . . . According to some cases, a witness may not testifY as to whether or not he had
a particular disease or was treated for a particular disease.").
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based upon out-of-court statements made by a treating physician. 316
There is little question that a person can descnbe subjective
experiences of pain and other symptoms or that he or she is in a state
of general good health. 317 One may also testify as to what actions may
lead (based upon reasonable inference) to an exacerbation of
symptoms ("My back hurts when I lift my infant daughter" or "My
medication makes me sleepy"). 318 Courts generally permit one to
testify as to the impact of a medical condition on one's ability to
perform work or other tasks as compared with the time before the
onset ofthe condition. 319

316. See, e.g., Marcus v. Lindsey, 592 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. 1992) (noting prior
case law holding that a plaintiff may generally testify as to the fact and symptoms of a
fractured bone, but cannot testify as to other medical effects of the injury.jtself); Howard v.
Feld, 298 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a plaintiffi:liay testify as to an
injury, as long as there are no disputed issues beyond a layperson's lmowledge, such as scope
and cause of injury).
·
317. See, e.g., Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331,337 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A witness does
not need to be a doctor to discuss his or her health in general terms."); Graves v. Graves, 531
So. 2d 817, 822 (Miss. 1988) (noting that a plaintiff in a personal injury action is permitted
"to testify as to his own pain and suffering and to describe his physical injuries").
318. See, e.g., Guyer v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 292 S.E.2d 445,448 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff could testify as to her "observations of the effect on
her work" of her injury); McMahon v. Richard Gorazd, bic., 481 N.E.2d 787, 796 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff may testify as to symptoms experienced after taking certain
medications).
319. See, e.g., Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 24 S.E.2d 834, 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) ("The
court did not err in permitting the plaintiff to answer the following question: 'Tell the jury
whether or not you are as able physically to do the duties that you have to do now as you were
before you were hurt by this elevator?' The extent of the plaintiff's injuries and his disability
physically were for the jury, and it was not improper to allow the plaintiff to answer the
question."). Furthermore, the court in Carter v. Bradford, 126 S.E.2d 158, 160 (N.C. 1962),
noted:
The testimony to which objection was made involved her statement that from the
date ofher injury to the date of her testimony she had lost 90 per cent of the use of
her right hand. The defendant insists this evidence involves the expression of
opinion which plaintiff is not qualified to give and that the objection should have
been sustained on that ground. However, a lay witness may express opinion about
his present state of health, ability to do work, etc. "The ability of a party to
perform physical or mental labor is not a question of such exclusively technical
significance as to permit expert testin1ony to be given conclusive .effect." The
plaintiff, a typist and bookkeeper, was in a better position than any other person to
know what she had done with her right hand prior to the injury and what she was
able to do with it afterwards. The testimony does not attempt to project the
disability or to anticipate its future effect. She was merely testifying as to how the ·
injury had handicapped her to the date of the testimony. Its admission was not
error.
ld (citations omitted). The court in Roberts T{ Motor Cargo, Inc., 104 N.W.2d 546, 550
(Minn. 1960) noted:

'
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To the extent that a pla:intiff is deemed to be offering an opinion
of her own condition, her testimony must fall within the requirements
of "Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses" in Federal Rule of Evidence
701:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding ofthe witness' testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702.320

More specifically then, the question can be phrased as whether a
pla:intiff's opinipn about her own condition is "rationally based" upon
her own perception of the condition rather than upon "scientific,
technical, or other specialized lmowledge."
The reported opinions :indicate that few courts permit one to ·
testify that she has a particular disease or condition, or the permanency
of a condition. 321 It would seem, however, that a diagnosis or condition
is the sort of fact, noted by the McConnick on Evidence editors, that a
pla:intiff would offer based upon both reports of others (specifically,
her health care provider's diagnosis, for example, of a"spastic colon")
and her own perception of the condition (her experience of frequent
322
Thus, courts should not exclude
and painful bowel movenients).
such testimony out of hand, but, as is done with the fact of a person's
age, should consider the overall reliability of such evidence given the
circumstances :in which it is offered, perhaps :in light of facts
323
Indeed, :in practice, courts and
appropriate for judicial notice.

Generally, an injured person may testify with regard to the results he has
experienced from his injury, his symptoms, pain he has suffered, the effect of his
injury on his physical condition and on his ability to do work or certain kinds of
work. For instance, a witness has been permitted to testify that as a result of his
•injury he had no use of his foot; that the injury he suffered had reduced his ~bility
to do carpenter work and to what extent; that a stone cutter, an injured layman,
could testify that if his arm remained the same he would not be able to resume his
trade.

Id
320. FED.R.EVID. 701.
321. See Barber v. Verizon New England, Inc., No. Civ.A.05-390-ML, .2006 WL
3524465, at *6 (D.R.I. Dec. 6, 2006) (stating that a plaintiff's testimony regarding a doctor's
speculative diagnosis is inadmissible).
322. McCORMICK, supra note 304, § 10, at23.
323. See Gage v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 365 F. Supp. 2d 919, 929 (N.D. Ill.
2005) ("While medical evidence may be difficult to understand without the use of an expert
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opposing counsel will likely raise few barriers to an individual stating
a diagnosis unless the fact of the diagnosis is truly a central dispute in
the case.
In the ADA context, only a few courts have specifically
aclmowledged the potential evidentiary limitations on a plaintiff's
ability to testify as to her medical condition in the context of proving
that she is disabled under the statute. In Cruz Carollo v. AA1R Eagle,
Jnc., 324 a court noted that the plaintiff was not competent to testify as to
the impact of HIV infection on his abilitY to reproduce, and his failure
to produce medical evidence on the issue, in contrast to the plaintiff in
Bragdon v. Abbott,325 was fatal to his claim.326 In Holt v. Olmsted
Township Board ofTrustees, the United States District Court for the
N orthem District of Ohio ruled that the plaintiff could not testify to her
diagnoses of cytomegalovirus, chronic fatigue syndrome, and
fibromyalgia, but she could generally describe her "condition."327
In Mehta v. Council for Jewish Elderly, the United States District
Court for the N orthem District oflllinois denied a defendant's motion
to exclude the plaintiff's testimony regarding her medical condition
(patchy bulbar duodentis). 328 The court noted that the plaintiff may
testify as to her oWn perceptions and opinions ofher medical condition
and that it was up to the jury whether to credit her testimony. 329 This
approach was followed in the same district several years later in
Denson v. Northeast Dlinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp.,
which held that a plaintiff may testify as to her own experience of her
condition (an arm and shoulder injury) but not what her doctors have
told her. 330
In the ADA context, where issues of ca,usation, prognosis or the
adequacy of medical treatment play no role, rules regarding the
opinion, courts have routinely held that lay individuals ·are certainly capable of reliably
understanding and testifying to their own medical conditions.").
324. 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D.P.R. 2001).
325. 524 U.S. 624, 630 (1998) (holding that an IDV-positive plaintiff was disabled
under the ADA even though the "medical" evidence offered consisted ofmedical literature on
HIV infection rather than evidence specific to the plaintiff herself).
326. Such a fact may be appropriate for judicial notice, however. See supra notes 120
126 and accompanying text.
327. 43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815,819-20 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
328. No. 95 C 1156, 1996 WL 272520, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1996).
329. ld at *3.
330. No. 00 C 2984, 2003 WL 1732984, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003); cf. So. Cal.
Housing Rights v. Los Feliz Towers HomeownersAss'n, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069-70 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (holding that under the Fair Housing Amendment Act, medical evidence was
required to prove disability because the plaintiff could only testify as to symptoms and their
impact on her life, not the actual medical condition).
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competencY of an individual to testify to her own medical condition
need not be so strictly applied as in cases in which such issues are in
dispute. Indeed, as described above with respect to testimony about
birth and kinship, it is not logical or practical to push the personal
lmowledge or hearsay rules to an absurd point. There is something
inherently odd about not permitting a person with cancer to utter the
words "I have cancer" or likewise for an individual to testify "I have a
broken leg" or "I have diabetes" if she has such conditions. Of course,
in the most literal sense, she does not really ''know" she has a tumor,
and that is something that her physicians could not themselves discern
. until they ran a scan, X-ray, or blood tests. She can certainly testify
that she has pain, fatigue, and physician-imposed restrictions on her
activities, but why should she not state the reason for such pain,
fatigue, and restrictions? She can testify that she goes to the hospital
once a week and has an intravenous drip; she should not be precluded
from testifying that such treatment is "chemotherapy." Similarly,·
statements such as "They removed a lobe ofmy lung last March" need
not be excluded. There is unquestionably a point at which a person's
subjective experience of her illness becomes melded with her personal
lmowledge and awareness based upon information·· from reliable
sources. In other words, does not one gain personal lmowledge of
one's own body at some point such that one is no longer merely
parroting the words of a physician? To at least some degree, courts'
overly technical division of "lmowledge" of medical conditions is a
further reflection of the role we expect physicians to play in society;
that to the exclusion of the patients themselves, physicians are the sole
guardians of the knowledge and understanding of their patients'
illnesses and physical limitations.
Moreover, since the regulations and case law dictate an
individualized case-by-case review of the impact of an alleged
impairment on the individual, the central facts in an ADA disability
determination analysis must be the plaintiff's indiVidual experience of
her disability, particularly as they impact her major life activities. 331 As
discussed above, no witness can provide more direct and competent
personal lmowledge of such facts than the plaintiff herself. For this
reason as well, it seems that courts must take a more reasonable
approach to the admissibility of such evidence in ADA claims. 332

331. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999).
332. ·For example, such evidence may be particularly appropriate for admissibility
under the "residual exception" to the rule against hearsay provided in the Federal Rules of
I
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CONCLUSION: THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DISABILITY AS A
POLITICAL CATEGORY

This discussion leads us to a final question: Why should we care
if courts impose a requirement of producing corroborating medical
evidence to establish that one is disabled under the ADA? The answer
goes to the fulfillment (or not) of the ADA's mandate to eradicate
discrimination on the basis of disability. The continued hegemony of
medicine in notions of disability, with a focus on personal impairment
and malingering, serves as an impediment to reframing notions of
disability as urged by disability scholars and activists. A requirement
of "proof" of disability from a medical provider impedes the class of
disability from emerging as a truly protected status, approaching that
of race, gender, religion, and age. 333 It serves to perpetuate the central
role of medicine in notions of disability, preventing a broader, more
powerful conceptualization ofthe term. 334
The continued association of disability with medicine-and
therefore with siclmess, tragedy, dependence, and other stigmatizing
notions of powerlessness and victimhood-undermines the very
paradigm shift that many advocates sought to bring about with the
ADA's enactment.335 By making the plaintiff's role as "patient" the
Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 807 (permitting admissibility of certain evidence that would
otherwise be hearsay with "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness").
333. Professor Mary Crossley noted the problem of the courts' requirerpent of medical
evidence to prove disability in her 1999 article, The DisabilityKaleidoscope, and observed:
As a political matter, disability studies scholars view the identifying or labeling of
who is disabled as an exercise ofunequal power, and have argued that the power to
define who is disabled has historically been used to advance the interests of groups
providing services to disabled people rather than to advance the interests or well
being of disabled people themselves.
Crossley, supra note 21, at 690 (footnotes omitted); accord Berg, supra 46, at 44 ("[T]he
practice of determining disability on an individualized basis undermines a sustained political
consciousness among people with disabilities and, in turn, undermines a unified disability
rights movement.").
334. Linton has observed:
When medical definitions of disability are dominant, it is logical to separate people
according to biomedical condition through the use of diagnostic categories and to
forefront medical perspectives on human variation. When disability is redefmed as
a social/political category, people with a variety of conditions are identified as
people with disabilities or disabledpeople, a group bound by common social and
political experience.
LINTON, supra note 5, at 12.
335. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 210, at 1059. Professor
Diller notes that:
[A] disturbing tendency to adhere to the "medical abnormality" view of disability
has become apparent in cases· dealing with the ADA. This tendency threatens to
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preliminary question-before . considering her role as employee,
patron, or citizen-judges immediately place a plaintiff in a position of
336
being pathologized, pitied and therefore disempowered. If a plaintiff
declines to put forth a construct of herself as "patient," as is the case
where a plaintiff offers only her own narrative of her disability, she is
precluded entirely from presenting her account of discrimination to the
fact finder.
hnposing a requirement of expert medical testimony that goes
beyond diagnosis also places many plaintiffs in the position of having
to disclose information to attorneys, judges, and perhaps the general
public that is deeply personal, private, and perhaps humiliating in the
prosecution of her ADA claims.337 No other category of employment
discrimination forces a plaintiff to do so.338 Thus, the medical evidence
requirement itself may serve as a powerful deterrent to those seeking
to vindicate their rights under the ADA. 339
drain Title I of the ADA of its vitality, rendering its provisions an exercise in the
rhetoric of equality, rather than a means of achieving real social change.

Id
336. Professor Laura Rovner provides a thoughtful discussion of the question of
"whether litigation, a traditional vehicle for enforcing civil rights, may create its own boxes
and stereotypes" and therefore poses a "risk to persons with disabilities of allowing lawyers
to conceptualize their stories and define their identities." Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma, supra
note 28, at 249. For example, a disabled person who is an active, accomplished person may
not, in her own mind, fit the stereotype of the "helpless cripple." Jd at 282-83. As Professor
Rovner has observed: "[M]any disability rights advocates have made careful, concerted
efforts to reject imagery and language that portray disabled people as being pitiable,
powerless, or victimized by virtue of their disabilities." Jd at 291-92.
337. See Berg, supra note 46, at 39-41 ("Within the structure of disability
determinations, the plaintiff's body is an object to be investigated by lawyers, doctors, and
vocational experts, and ultimately codified by the judge. . . . [P]laintiffs who wish to
persuade a judge that they are disabled have no choice but to portray their impairment-in all
its corporeal detail-as the central and defining feature of their identity and daily lives."); see'
also Sarka v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 ER.D. 127, 130 (B.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that an
ADA plaintiff claiming disability due to depression had waived the psychotherapist-plaintiff
privilege, without limitation, and "must therefore authorize the release of all records that
contain confidential communications with her psychiatrist that are relevant to her mental
condition during the time she was in Defendant's employ").
338. Seesupranotes 165-171 andaccompanyingtext.
339. An experience from my own practice illustrates the hazards faced by ADA
plaintiffs. I represented a deaf couple claiming discrimination in public accommodations;
specifically, a medical practice that refused to provide American Sign Language (ASL)
interpreters for office visits. The defendants vigorously contested that my clients were
disabled (despite the fact that they both used ASL and received all of their education at
schools for the Deaf). Defense attorneys attempted to subpoena medical records, including
records of their marriage counseling sessions, as well as emergency dispatch tapes in an
attempt to locate and reveal contexts in which my clients used speech instead of ASL. The
federal magistrate judge granted my motion for a protective order regarding most of the items
sought, including the counseling records, and specifically rejected the defendant's arguments
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Overreliance on medical evidence similarly reinforces false
notions of the objectivity and certainty of medicine, most importantly
that of a medical diagnosis. There is no objective basis in science for
the discrete and judgmental categories of "normal" and "abnormal" as
distinct :from the statistically more or less nurnerous. 340 Moreover, the
act of diagnosis and classification is not :free :from elements of social
control, stigma, and politicallabeling.341 An ADA plaintiff therefore is
compelled to adopt and promote the labels assigned by the medical
profession (with accompanying connotations of being disordered or
defective) even where such labels may conflict with her self-identity,
including her political identity as a citizen entitled to obtain and
maintain employment and to have full access to public accommoda
tions and services.
As I have argued previously, courts' hypertechnical readings of
the ADA definition of disability preclude· analysis of the larger
questions posed by the ADA regarding the place of people with
disabilities in workplaces, public accommodations, and public

that the plaintiffs had put their entire medical history in play by filing an ADA claim.
However, because the issue of what evidence is discoverable in ADA cases was not clearly
defined in the law, the matter had to be briefed and argued before a magistrate. Although my
clients ultimately prevailed on many of the issues raised in the motion for a protective order,
the very discussion of these categories of evidence threatened to compromise my clients'
privacy and dignity.
As cultural historian Douglas Baynton notes:
With the focus on plaintiffs' bodies, disabled people are placed in the undignified
(to say the least) position of having to impress judge with the seriousness of their
impairment. By locating the crux of the issue in the body of the individual rather
than in discriminatory attitudes and practices, people who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of a physical, mental or psychological difference from
the majority can nevertheless be excluded from ADA protection.
Douglas C. Baynton, Bodies and Their Environments: The Cultural Construction of .
Disability, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 387,
393 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000).
340. Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 224, at I 02, I08-1 09; Lennard J. Davis, Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve,
the Novel, and the Invention of the Disabled Body in the Mneteenth Centwy, in THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 43, at 9, 13-14.
341. See, e.g., PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND
MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 28-37 (expanded ed. 1992); THOMAS SZASZ,
INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 17-18 (1987); Mary Crossley, Impairment and
Embodiment, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 224, at 111, 120-22; Shelley Tremain, Foucault,
Govemmentality, and Cnl:ical Disability Theory: An Introduction, in FOUCAULT AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY, supra note 24, at 1, 4-11.
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services.342 Rejecting such a reading would not mean that every ADA
plaintiff would prevail. Indeed, the case law of Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act reveals that courts have spent
decades working through the myriad of issues presented by claims of
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, age, and other
characteristics. But the discussion of the corresponding issues in the
disability category cannot begin in earnest in ADA cases until courts
loosen the restrictive grip on the class of individuals entitled to present
their claims to a fact finder.
This Article has argued that in view of the current language of the
ADA, and more generally, contemporary approaches to evidence and
summary judgment, courts are wrong to grant summary judgment to
defendants based solely on an absence of corroborating expert medical
evidence to support a finding of disability. Others elsewhere make
compelling arguments for revisions to the text of the ADA, such as
introducing a nonexhaustive list of diseases and conditions which
would establish disability per se. 343 Such revisions may well address
other problems with the application of the law and could move notions
of disability away from medically associated terms such as
impairment.
·The question will remain, however, of how one proves that one
has something "on the list." Other commentators have proposed
eliminating the requirement of proof of a substantial limitation of a
major life activity in order to meet the statute's definition of
disability. 344 Under this approach, the focus would be on "barriers in
that person's environment," rather than requiring "cumb~rsome
evidentiary showings . . . . [with an emphasis on] irrelevant medical
details about the impairment in order to state a claim."345 "While such
an amendment would certainly compel an appropriately refocused
inquiry in ADA claims, there is unlikely to be sufficient political
346
support for the change at this time, leaving the questions of proof,
342. Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment
Discrimination, and The Americans with Disabilities Ac~ 17 GEO. MASON. U. Crv. RTS. L.J.
79, 148-49 (2006). '
343. See, e.g., Mark A Rothstein et al., .Using Established Medical Criteria to DeHne
Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans U;lth DisabilitiesAc~ 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243,
282-96 (2002) (proposing to amend the ADA to authorize the EEOC to publish medical
standards for evaluating the severity of the most common impairments and to establish a
presumption that individuals who meet such criteria are covered under the statute).
344. Center & Imparato, supra note 28, at 323.
345. Id at 324.
346. Id at 344 ("We recognize that our proposed new formulation may not be easy to
sell politically."). The proposed ':ADA Restoration Act of 2007;' H.R. 3195, 110th Cong.
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and, ultimately, fairness, to be resolv.ed through litigation unde.r the
existing definition of disability. 347 However, there is nothing in the
current definition of disability to prevent courts from permitting
plaintiffs to establish through their own testimony that they fall within
the statute's protections by describing the substantial limitations
imposed by both physiological andsocial sources--on their lives.
It is important to emphasize that the instant discussion is about
establishing a prima facie case, what is required to get to a fact finder's
determination, and not about what is ultimately persuasive for a fact
finder. The court system is, of course, always and appropriately
concerned with issues of deception and fakery by litigants for personal
(or corporate) gain. However, warnings about the specter of "abuse"
in the disability context fail to recognize that the "system" we worry
about protecting from liars and manipulators already has a guardian
the fact finder-and an adversarial process designed to permit parties
to test the sufficiency of others' allegations. 348 ·
This Article is not calling for a legal mandate preventing any
plaintiff from losing in court as the result of an absence of expert
349
medical testimony. That is not warranted, practical or appropriate, or
consistent with the ADA as presently drafted. But courts should not
dismiss claims before trial on the basis that jurors will not likely find
(2007), introduced in the United States House of Representatives on July 26, 2007, woulcl,
among other things, remove the "substantial limitation" requirement from the ADA's
definition of disability. The prospect of the legislation being enacted in its present form
cannot be determined at this time.
347. Other commentators have argued that courts can and should take a significantly
different approach to determining disability within the existing statutory framework. For
example, Professor Bagenstos argues that when assessing whether a plaintiff is an individual
with a disability within the meaning of the ADA, courts should require a plaintiff to establish
"only that she has an (actual, past, or perceived) impairment to which society's choices are
likely to attach systematic disadvantage . . . . by illustrating the ways in which society
through a variety of contingent decisions-stigmatizes and/or attaches systematic
disadvantage to [her] particular impairment[]." Bagenstos, supra. note 38, at 473, 481. While
I agree that "such an approach has a strong pedigree in disability rights thought," it may not
eliminate courts' requirement of medical evidence of the claimed "impairment," perhaps
coupled with requiring other expert testimony on how the plaintiff's impairment is
substantially limiting through stigmatization. Jd at 481.
348. See supra note 209 (regarding findings in evolutionary psychology of "cheater
detection" mechanisms in human cognitive functioning).
349. This could occur, for example, if a judge did not require a.ny evidence to
demonstrate that the plaintiff fell within the statute's protected class or instructed the jury that
it must find the plaintiff to be disabled. However, it would be appropriate to include a jury
instruction explaining that the plaintiff is not required to produce medical evidence to succeed
on her claim to prevent jurors from exercising bias regarding the need for such evidence (such
as that exemplified in courts and media as described in this Article) and to move away from a
purely medicalized notion of"disability."
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the plaintiff to be disabled in the absence of corroborating testimony.
It is the job of the defendant's attorney at trial to raise the issue of the
sufficiency and quality of the plaintiff's evidence. It is perfectly valid
for a defendant's attorney to cross-examine a plaintiff on the extent of a
plaintiff's limitations. It is also appropriate for a defense attorney to
argue in closing, as would be true in any kind of case, that the
plaintiff's testimony should be disbelieved and to point out the dearth
of other evidence, whether lay observation or expert opinion, to
support such testimony. A defense attorney may or may not succeed
with such an approach. A jury may decide that even in the absence of
other "corroborating" evidence, the plaintiff's own account of her
limitations is credible and sufficient. Courts, then, must step aside to
allow fact finders to do their job.

